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0. BACKGROUND 
Antecedents 
In May 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration and Development Research 
Group (M&D) at Radboud University started to explore the possibilities for collaborating on 
the theme of international migration, which became an increasingly important policy theme in 
the course of the final decade of the last century, both in relation to the need to deal with 
questions of integration (how to deal with migrants in Dutch society), and, especially, in rela-
tion to efforts to incorporate migration issues as a new element in Dutch development coope-
ration, and also in anticipation of the participation of the Netherlands in the UN high-level 
dialogue on 14 and 15 September 2006.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was aware of the increasing growth rate of the world's 
migrant population, acknowledged the need for a better understanding of the root causes of 
migration and the need to contribute to policy formulation for optimizing the link between (in-
ternational) development and migration, in particular, for the countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(and also from the perspective of achieving the millennium development goals).  
The M&D research group at the Radboud University, supported by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, elaborated a proposal for a joint project with the title ‘International migration and na-
tional development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin’, which was 
aimed at gaining a better understanding of the implications of international migration for na-
tional development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an emphasis on sub-
Saharan Africa). This project was started in May 2006, and aimed to gain a better un-
derstanding of the link between international migration and national development and to pre-
sent policy recommendations on how to stimulate migration for development. 
The project consisted of a number of research activities, including desk research, field mis-
sions and an international experts’ meeting, financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
was carried out with the active participation of policy makers. In the course of the process, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment also decided to participate and agreed to 
contribute to the project by co-financing activities.  
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Purpose of the project 
The purpose of the project is to explore (1) current perceptions - as seen from the perspecti-
ve of the countries of origin - of the links between international migration and national deve-
lopment, and (2) current trends in policy making aimed at minimizing the negative effects, 
while optimizing the development impact. What are the dominant view and policy initiatives in 
the different countries of sub-Saharan Africa? 
Various/ multi- faced angles and perspectives are explored with the help of the following 
questions: What is the sending countries’ view of the rapid out-migration of skilled and un-
skilled labour? What is the sending countries’ perception of the advantages and disadvanta-
ges of temporary and/or circular migration as against permanent migration? What is their 
perception of return migration and how is this linked to national development. What are the 
implications of international migration for national development and poverty reduction strate-
gies (as reflected in PRSPs)? How is migration perceived from the regional perspective 
(ECOWAS, etc.) and what kind of initiatives are currently underway to optimise the develop-
ment implications? 
To what extent are sending countries actively involved in formulating migration policies; What 
kinds of efforts are currently made (by government and civil society) to overcome the nega-
tive consequences of the brain drain and the shortage of human resources? What experien-
ces do countries have in involving return migrants in development projects, co-development 
etc? How do countries respond to migrant recruitment practices? What are the current con-
cerns with respect to the gender and generational aspects of migration and how are these 
responded to? What are the current bottlenecks in migration management and how could 
capacity building help to optimise the link with national development? How do sending count-
ries deal with the issues of security and protection of migrants (at home and abroad) and with 
civil rights?  
What is the role of governments and migrant organisations in mobilizing knowledge and 
technology available in the diaspora towards the home country? What kind of agreements 
are currently signed between sending and receiving countries, and what are the implications 
for development? What bottlenecks are perceived and how could donors contribute to opti-
mizing the link between international migration trends and national development?   
Most attention was paid during the project to Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Kenya and 
Nigeria, but some attention was also paid to a large number of other countries (Sudan, So-
malia, Burundi, Cape Verde, Tanzania, Mali, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Botswana, 
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Congo and Ghana). During the project, interesting comparisons were made with relevant 
cases from other continents, e.g. the Philippines, China, India and Mexico. 
 
Project activities and methodology 
The project, consisting of desk research, field missions and an international experts’ meeting, 
was carried out between May and December 2006, and started with the following activities: 
 
Desk research 
• Inventory of policy documents/ state and donor policies with respect to international 
migration, including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
• Statistical analysis of migration streams, inventory of migration routes, with an 
emphasis on temporary/ circular migration;  
• Inventory of policy initiatives through a questionnaire distributed among the Dutch 
embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; 
• Interviewing migrant and diaspora organisations related to sub-Saharan Africa opera-
ting in the Netherlands. 
 
Additional data collection took place during field missions to Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Rwanda and Kenya (between June and September 2006). During these missions emphasis 
was placed on local perceptions and current policy initiatives relating to international migrati-
on.  
Finally, we organised an International Experts’ meeting in collaboration with the Human Re-
sources Development Centre (Lagos, Nigeria) which took place on 23-24 August at the Rad-
boud University. This brought together an international group of scholars and policy makers 
from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and Europe. Their written contributions and 
the discussions generated relevant information about perceptions and policies (see Adepoju, 
van Naerssen and Zoomers [2006]). The proceedings of this meeting were used as an input 
to the Dutch contribution to the-high level dialogue on Migration and Development on Sep-
tember 14-15 in New York. 
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The present Report aims to give an overall overview of the complete output of the project. 
For a complete overview of the project output, see the Working Paper Series Migration and 
Development (reports 1-14). These reports are available on the websites of the Radboud 
University and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.minbuza.nl).  
 
Project team 
The project was carried out under the coordination of Prof. Annelies Zoomers (CEDLA, Rad-
boud University) and Dr. Ton van Naerssen (Radboud University), and involved an internati-
onal and multidisciplinary team of researchers (geography, anthropology, economics, de-
mography) affiliated to various institutions.  
More specifically, the following persons were actively involved in the various activities: 
• 5 junior researchers (Joep Kusters, David van Moppes, Roald Plug, Joris Schapen-
donk, Marleen van der Veen, Radboud University) (Desk research/ interviewing 
migrant and diaspora organisations, and organisation of the experts’ meeting) 
• Prof. Aderanti Adepoju (Human Resources Development Centre; Lagos, Nigeria); co-
organiser of experts’ meeting. 
• Dr. Annelet Broekhuis (IDS, UU, Utrecht) Field missions to Burkina Faso and Senegal 
(the latter in collaboration with Babacar Ndione) 
• Prof. Leo de Haan (ASC, Leiden) Resource person (experts’ meeting) 
• Dr. Hein de Haas (Oxford University, Oxford) Field mission to Nigeria (in collaboration 
with Jean Munro) 
• Dieudonné Muhoza and Pierre Claver Rutayisire (Utrecht University) Field mission to 
Rwanda. 
• Dr. Ton van Naerssen (Radboud University) Desk research (migration and diaspora 
organisations) 
• Dr. Marcel Rutten (ASC, Leiden) Field mission to Kenya (in collaboration with Koki 
Muli). 
• Dr. Ernst Spaan (NIDI, The Hague) Desk research 
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Prof. Annelies Zoomers (CEDLA/ Radboud University), co-organiser of experts’ meeting and 
general coordination of desk research and field missions. 
This team worked in close collaboration with Marjan Wind (SPL), Marieke van Renssen 
(DPV), Desirée Ooft (SPL) based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Jan Verboom (Mi-
nistry of Social Affairs and Employment). During the project, we discussed the preliminary 
results at working meetings. Policy makers participated actively during the experts’ meeting. 
The final results were presented and discussed during a lunch lecture at the Ministry of Fo-
reign Affairs on November 21 2006. This meeting was attended by over 100 policy makers 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Mi-
nistries of Justice and Economic Affairs, and other institutions (OIM, ICCO etc.).  
 
1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RESULTS  
1. Introduction 
This project focuses on achieving a better understanding of the implications of international 
migration for national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an 
emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). More specifically, it is concerned with the question of how 
a coherent international migration policy can contribute to the fight against poverty. 
For a long time policy makers paid little attention to migration. The most attention in deve-
lopment cooperation was paid to the encouragement of local development and, where atten-
tion was paid to migration it was generally viewed as the opposite pole to development: out-
migration was regarded as an expression of poverty and development projects were inten-
ded to contribute to the reduction of outmigration. 
This situation has recently changed. There are various reasons why international migration is 
now high on the agenda. On the one hand, it is a consequence of increasing problems with 
the multicultural society in the receiving area, combined with a fear of invasion. On 1 Sep-
tember 2006 the website of the Algemeen Persbureau (AP) carried the report: There seems 
to be no end to the explosion of migrants from Africa. In the past two days over 800 migrants 
have arrived in the Canary Isles. 9,000 have already been intercepted in 2006. In August 
their number was higher than in the whole of 2005. There is an increasing impression that 
migrants are streaming in from all sides and that there is a growing need to check migration 
flows. Whereas the emphasis was initially placed on restrictive (and anti-migrant) policies, 
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there now appears to be a shift towards selective policies (including circular migration): be-
cause of the increasing ageing of the population in the receiving countries, there is a growing 
realisation that a call will have to be made in the not too distant future on migrant labour. 
Another, more positive, reason why more attention has recently been paid to migration is the 
growing conviction that international migration cannot be seen in isolation from development, 
and that, with the right policies, an important contribution can be made to development1.  
With regard to the question of whether international migration can or cannot contribute to 
sustainable development and combating poverty there are at present two opposing views2. 
According to the optimists, international migration offers good possibilities. They point in the 
first place to the remittances which are seen as a new or additional source of finance for de-
velopment. According to estimates by the World Bank (2006), these remittances amounted to 
no less than 167,000 million dollars3. They are estimated to benefit some 500 million people, 
or 8 percent of the world population. The amount is greater than the official development aid. 
According to Adams & Page (2003), through remittances, migration has a direct effect on the 
reduction of poverty: an increase of 10 per cent in a country’s share of international migrants 
leads to a 2 percent decline in 1$ a day poverty4. In addition to the financial remittances, a 
positive value is also attributed to the social transfers (the flow of information and ideas): 
countries of origin are said to be able to benefit from brain gain, not to mention the positive 
effects of return migration. Migration is viewed as positive factor, because it leads to a balan-
ce on the labour market5 and because international labour migration is expected to contribu-
te to the banishment of inequality and to lead to a better distribution of the advantages of 
globalisation. Migration impacts positively upon all stakeholders, as evidenced by the fact 
that sending countries and the migrants themselves benefit, because migrants find jobs, de-
velop their skills, earn some money and remit part of it to their countries of origin, while des-
tination countries benefit from the skills and labour they receive from migrants. 
Alongside these there is a group of pessimists who particularly emphasise a number of nega-
tive aspects and threatening dangers. They point to the fact that international migration can 
                                               
1
 The World Bank (2003) put emphasis on  importance of  remittances and played an important role in stimulating 
the debate on migration and development  by the organisation of several conferences, together with DFID (UK).   
2
 de Haas 2003; de Haan 2005. 
3
 World Bank 2006. 
4
 Adams & Page 2003; in de Haan 2005:2.  
5
 Jones 1992: in Mafukidze 2006:105  
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lead to conflicts in the host countries, but also stress particularly the negative consequences 
for the areas of origin, especially the loss of labour and intellect. They point out that it is ge-
nerally the best and the brightest, the young, able-bodied people who leave first. Where 
migrants do decide to return to their home country, this is mainly a reflection of failure. Re-
turn migrants are likely to be the old, sick and unsuccessful and skills brought back are unli-
kely to be of much help6. The poorest with the worst training and the disabled without net-
works therefore remain behind and those who fail are the first to return. This has unavoidable 
negative effects in the sending region. To the extent that these are compensated by money 
transfers, a high measure of dependency is created, while conflicts can easily arise between 
migrants and non-migrants, and undesirable patterns of regional inequality.  
Although there are therefore opposing views, a growing consensus is now emerging that 
although international migration does not automatically lead to favourable effects, it can con-
tribute to development and poverty reduction provided an appropriate and consistent policy is 
pursued7. International organisations (UN, IOM, ILO etc.) and national governments of nu-
merous countries are now actively involved in optimizing the link between international mig-
ration and national development. There are many different initiatives aimed at streamlining 
international migration and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and go-
vernments of sending and receiving countries are increasingly involved in streamlining their 
attempts in managing migration in the right directions.  
However, much of what is happening today is taking place on the initiative of the receiving 
countries, and is dominated by the wish to control or restrict migration and to protect their 
borders. Little is known about how governments in the sending countries perceive migration, 
whether they see international migration as a positive or negative force in their attempt to 
achieve national development, and about what kind of policy initiatives are currently taken to 
optimise the development impact while restricting the negative consequences. 
Before presenting the local views and policy initiatives, we will first provide the necessary 
information about the characteristics of migration (2) and recent trends (3), as an essential 
basis for further analysis. 
 
                                               
6
 de Haan 2005. 
7
 UNFPA 2004. 
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2. The characteristics of international labour migration: towards a 
typology 
This research project has focused in particular on international labour migration (the move-
ment of persons, i.e. non-nationals or foreigners, across national borders for purposes other 
than travel or short-term residence8). Little attention will be paid to other groups, such as 
refugees, internationally displaced persons and/or asylum seekers9 although it is difficult in 
practice to make a clear division10. 
The number of international labour migrants is currently estimated at between 175 and 200 
million11, about 3 percent of the world population. If we try to obtain a picture of the direction 
of the international migration flows, we find that there is a limited number of dominant desti-
nations, i.e. the classical immigration countries (the United States [US] and Canada), a num-
ber of countries on the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Emirates) and, lastly, a number of European countries (France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Spain and Italy). Viewed from a distance, migration streams seem to flow from the 
poor south towards the richer northern countries, although there are considerable differences 
in the type of migration and the opportunities for integration and upward mobility.  
• The US/Canada. 
The migration flows to the United States and Canada derive - as one might expect – 
mainly from Mexico and the Caribbean (over 20 million Mexicans and Cubans live 
and work in de US), although there has recently also been a marked growth in the 
migration of highly skilled people from China and India. After the granting of the H1 
visa, migrants can quite easily settle with their families and, as long as they have 
work, there is a good possibility that the visa will be extended. 
 
                                               
8
 Messina & Lahav 2006: 1. 
9
 Skeldon 1990; Mafukidze 2006:104 
10
 This section, and the analysis which follows is based on Zoomers 2006 
11
 GCIM 2005; Farrant et al 2006. 
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• Gulf states (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates) 
and the Middle East.  
The flow of migration to the region of the Persian Gulf originates mainly from South 
and Southeast Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines and Thailand), but also increasingly from North, Central and East Africa. It con-
sists mainly of the temporary labour migration of unskilled men, but increasingly also 
of other groups, for example, a growing migration by women, particularly from Indo-
nesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. In addition, Saudi Arabia searches in countries 
such as Nigeria and Ghana for highly-skilled labour (female nurses and doctors). Re-
cruitment takes place mainly among Moslem populations, and there is a considerable 
flow of Somalis and Ethiopians across the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East (van Mop-
pes 2006). There is now also migration from West Africa (Burkina Faso) to the Gulf 
States (Broekhuis 2006). There is no possibility of visa extension in the Gulf States, 
so that each time a migrant’s contract expires, he/she has to leave the country. There 
are therefore no opportunities to settle permanently and migrants enjoy no right of 
family reunification. Recently, the growing presence of foreign labour appears to be 
leading increasingly to problems, especially in relation to worker’s rights, e.g. in 
wages, education and health, as demanded in the free trade agreement negotiations 
(Rutten 2006: 24).  
• EU (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy).  
A large part of the migration flows to countries of the European Union (EU) derives 
from North Africa and Turkey and is a direct consequence of migrant worker pro-
grammes (up to 1974) and the subsequent family reunification12. After a period in 
which immigration was largely determined by refugees and asylum seekers, the EU 
has recently been confronted with migrant flows from sub-Saharan Africa (especially 
Nigeria 72,000; Senegal, 77,000 and Cape Verde 43,000), Asia and Latin America. 
Most of the migrants enter via Spain and Italy (once emigration countries them-
selves), but the influence of the colonial past and/or cultural ties appears clearly in the 
ultimate division of the migrants over the different EU countries: West African mi-
grants go mainly to France; Latin Americans migrate relatively frequently to Italy and 
Spain; and Asians migrate proportionately rather more to the United Kingdom. The 
                                               
12
 Lucas 2004: 5. 
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Netherlands plays relatively only a modest role as a migration destination. The major-
ity of EU countries occupy an intermediate position in comparison with the US/ Can-
ada and the Gulf States. Where restrictive policies are operated, possibilities exist for 
family reunification and settlement; each country employs different definitions and 
pursues a different policy. The situation is heterogeneous as far as the circumstances 
of migrants (including integration and deportation policies) are concerned. 
Viewed from the receiving countries, - there therefore appears to be, at first sight, a relatively 
comprehensible situation in which globalisation has been translated into a worldwide migra-
tion system with richer receiving regions (receiving countries), on the one side, and poorer 
sending countries (countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America), on the other side. Thus from 
the perspective of the receiving regions there appears to be a situation in which the migration 
flows follow a relatively fixed pattern. An international migration system generally includes a 
core receiving region, which may be a country or group of countries, and a set of specific 
sending countries linked to it by unusually large flows of immigrants13. These migration flows 
are often matched by a reversed flow of remittances. 
If we look at international migration from the perspective of the sending countries, however, a 
different - more diverse - picture emerges (Zoomers 2006). The majority of migration flows 
are found not to be directed towards the core receiving countries just referred to. Only a lim-
ited number of countries are characterised by South-North migration. By far the majority of 
emigration countries are found to be the subject of South-South migration; in other instances 
we encounter diasporic states (states with a large migrant population fanning out over many 
countries).  
 
South-North Migration 
Examples of countries with South-North migration directed at one of the above core regions 
include Mexico (to the US); Morocco (to France, Germany etc.); Senegal (to France or 
Spain); and/or Ecuador (Spain). It concerns a limited group of countries with a clearly struc-
tured flow towards specific receiving countries with, in the case of the EU, the majority of the 
                                               
13
 Fawcett 1989, Zlotnik 1992. 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 15 
migrants entering via Spain and Italy, and/or settling in the former mother country (colonial 
ties)14.  
Countries with directed South-North migration enjoy the advantage that -thanks to migration- 
they have been able to strengthen their negotiating position with EU countries and gain ac-
cess to additional resources15. Negotiations increasingly take place between the sending and 
receiving countries (readmission and migrant quotas). Historical ties are selectively re-
established. Compared with other countries, they sit close to the fire and are able to benefit 
from new, as yet modest, work opportunities in the core regions. The migration puts them in 
the picture. 
What is interesting or, rather, problematical is the fact that these countries with strong South-
North migration (such as Senegal, Morocco etc.) – but also diasporic states like Kenya or 
Nigeria (see below) - are often seen in their own region as interesting destination and/or 
transition areas, and perform an important function as reception areas for South-South mi-
gration (see below). In order to satisfy the demands imposed by the northern countries (ad-
mission and deportation policies), these countries are often constrained to act more strin-
gently against the inflow from their neighbours. Mexico, for example, is obliged by the US to 
keep its southern border closed and to act against illegal immigrants, which has immediately 
negative consequences for intraregional relations and is also at odds with the striving for free 
mobility within the region (Ecowas, AU, Mercosur etc.). In order to qualify for legal migrant 
places, many of these countries are required to seal their borders hermetically and to act 
more stringently against illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries. In this sense, many 
of these countries have a northern agenda. 
 
European states seek Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of undocumented migrants or rejected 
asylum seekers. Nigeria is known as one of the most cooperative African states on this issue and has 
readmission deals with Italy, Spain, Ireland and Switzerland. Nigeria has asked for immigration quotas 
in exchange for collaboration in readmissions. Nigeria is rather willing to cooperate in increasing bor-
                                               
14
 Other examples of countries with important South North migration are Kenya and Nigeria; but given the disper-
sal of the population ‘overseas’ we decided to classify these countries as diasporic states (see below).  
15
 Where international organisations (such as OIM, ILO etc.) are currently undertaking initiatives to increase the 
development effect of migration (reduction of transaction costs of remittances; encouragement of brain gain/ limi-
tation of brain drain etc.; combating illegality etc. (programmes such as MIDA, TOKTEN etc.) these are often 
highly concentrated in countries with south-north migration. 
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der control and readmission (de Haas 2006). 
Since European countries have started to put pressure on Nigeria to collaborate with readmission 
policies, the Nigerian state appears to have begun more active emigration policies by negotiating im-
migrant quotas in exchange for collaboration (Nigeria’s own immigration policies are rather restrictive - 
most non-ecowas foreigners have to obtain a visa to come to Nigeria (de Haas 2006). 
Pressure from the European side and their more rigid immigration legislation, however, are forcing the 
African states to manage their migration flow more strictly and also to implement decisions formulated 
in many sub-regional (ECOWAS, UEMOA) conventions and agreements (Broekhuis and Ndione, 
2006: 10). 
 
South-South Migration 
In many countries - notably in sub-Saharan Africa – there is mainly South-South migration. 
These are often relatively poor (landlocked) countries. Examples include Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Niger (with migration to Ivory Coast, but also towards Nigeria and Senegal); Lesotho and 
Mozambique (with migration to South Africa and Botswana); and Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bu-
rundi, Congo and Rwanda, where continuing conflicts have caused a large part of the popu-
lation to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In 
Latin America examples include such countries as Paraguay and Bolivia, from where, until 
recently, large numbers emigrated to Argentina; Nicaragua (with migration to Costa Rica); 
and Honduras (mainly migration to Mexico). Asian examples are Indonesia (with a population 
of more than one million in Malaysia) and Myanmar (with one million living in Thailand). 
There is also considerable migration from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam 
to destinations within the region16.  
A high proportion of the migrants being discussed here have a relatively bad time in the re-
ceiving countries. Compared with migration to the northern countries, the possibilities for 
earning remittances are often limited in south-south migration. People migrate on a tempo-
rary basis in order to earn a supplementary income in the event of a crisis (circular migra-
tion); they often do not have the necessary documents, are illegal and have generally to be 
content with low-paid work (sometimes they take up the places left by the emigration of the 
country’s own population), or the migration is of the type known as “eat away” migration (see 
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Broekhuis 2006 for the situation in Burkina Faso). Migrants enjoy very little protection, either 
by their own government, or by the government in the receiving country, and cases of dis-
guised slavery are regularly found (such as recently in Argentina, when it was discovered 
how a business treated Bolivian migrants). Migrants are often the victims of discrimination 
and xenophobia - even in their own region - (as recently in Ivory Coast, but also in Botswana, 
Argentina and South Africa). The migrant population is sent back with great regularity from 
the neighbouring countries to the country of origin (as happened with the Burkinabé from 
Ivory Coast and the Ghanaians from Nigeria). Many Bolivians and Paraguayans have also 
returned from Argentina to their own countries as a consequence of the economic crisis 
(Zoomers 2006). 
 
Diasporic States (countries with a huge and dispersed overseas population, with a large 
number of expatriates) 
The migrants originating from diasporic states are by far the most numerous. As a result of 
outmigration over a long time covering several generations, a substantial part of the popula-
tion (including the elite) has now become dispersed over a large number of countries 
throughout the world. The numbers involved are impressive (in any event many times greater 
than the flow of south-north migration)17. The Asian diaspora is estimated at more than 70 
million. The largest is the Chinese diaspora - over 35 million (widely dispersed over South 
East Asia, but also the rest of the world). The figure for India is 20 million, that for the Philip-
pines over 7 million, and Korea has a diaspora of over 3.5 million. Other examples are Ma-
laysia with a diaspora of 5 million, Vietnam (1 million) and Pakistan. The Latin American di-
aspora is estimated at over 25 million. If we ignore Mexico and the Caribbean (which are 
oriented mainly on the US) and Argentina and Ecuador (relatively strongly oriented on Italy 
and Spain), we find that the countries mainly concerned are Colombia, Brazil, Peru and 
Venezuela, from where a group of over 8 million has fanned out over a large number of 
countries: not only the US, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Israel and Japan, but 
also over the neighbouring countries18. African examples of diasporic states are South Africa, 
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Nigeria19 and Kenya, but also on a more modest scale smaller countries such as Ghana, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia and the Cape Verde islands20.  
In contrast to the group of South-South migrants described above, these migrants relatively 
often constitute a well-off elite, including a considerable group of transnational entrepre-
neurs21. In a growing number of countries (including China, the Philippines and India22) the 
national government is pursuing an active policy to involve the diaspora in the national de-
velopment. In many countries, however, policy in this field has not yet crystallised out so 
clearly. Although it is customary to speak of migrants, we are referring here to what is often a 
consolidated group of well-to-do expatriates, the majority of whom have lived for many years 
outside their own countries, in some instances even for several generations, and many have 
succeeded in building up a successful new livelihood in the receiving country. Many coun-
tries have very little information about their diaspora and it is only relatively recently that the 
diaspora has been seen by governments as development potential (Adepoju, van Naerssen 
and Zoomers 2006). 
The above classification makes clear that, where migration is concerned, it is no longer suffi-
cient to divide the world into origin and destination regions and to connect the two groups 
with arrows to indicate the migrant and capital flows. There is a wide variety of ways in which 
countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the 
possibilities of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with di-
rected South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, 
while the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with fresh re-
strictions. 
The most favourable are the circumstances of the diasporic states: thanks to migration over 
many generations, they can call on a considerable overseas population which they can use 
as development potential. They have not so much to suffer under restrictive policies; the ma-
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 Nigeria plays a key role in African migration (the country has 140 million inhabitants). It is an example of an 
important emigration country (of the type diasporic state with a considerable diaspora in the EU [UK and the US]), 
but also important populations in South Africa and the Gulf states. The expatriate population is relatively well-
educated and established. At the same time, it is an important destination and transit area for the neighbouring 
states, and an important member of ECOWAS and the AU. Nigeria was for a long period an immigration country, 
but is now characterised by emigration to Ghana and Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa (de Haas 
2006) 
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 Sheffer 2003: 104-105. 
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 Van Naerssen, Spaan, Hillmann 2005. 
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jority of the migrants are already living in the reception region and are, more or less, suc-
cessfully integrated, so that they have relatively good possibilities for investment. Countries 
with South-North migration enjoy the advantage that they are clearly in the picture and can 
relatively easily negotiate about projects, readmission or migrant quotas. They sit close to the 
fire compared with other countries and so are able to profit from temporary requirements for 
migrant labour. 
This stands in contrast to the countries with mainly South-South migration, which are largely 
at the mercy of the policy of receiving countries in their own region (often therefore 
neighbouring countries), where conflicts are relatively quickly translated into inter-state prob-
lems; where problems of discrimination or xenophobia (which also arise in the north) remain 
relatively invisible, because the media pay attention mainly to tensions in the northern coun-
tries. 
 
3. Migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa and recent trends  
The heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration routes. Be-
cause of rapid changes in the volume and direction of migration there is a growing complex-
ity which is difficult to capture in a typology of migration countries. 
If we analyse the dominant migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Fortress Europe 
(van Moppes 2006), just as the route through Mexico is the main route for most Latin Ameri-
can migrants on their way to the United States, there is a restricted number of gateways to-
wards the EU. There are currently six main routes from sub-Saharan Africa, leading to three 
major departure areas (van Moppes 2006):  
• A large stretch of Africa’s west coast, including northern Mauritania (notably 
Nouadhibou), Western Sahara and southern Morocco. The Canary Islands, especially 
Fuerteventura, are the main destination for migrants arriving from these areas.  
• Northern Morocco. In this area are located the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, 
which form direct destinations on the African continent. In addition, the northern and 
north-western shores of Morocco are the main departure areas for small boats head-
ing toward the Spanish mainland, notably Andalusia. 
• The Tunisian east coast and western parts of the Libyan coast. From these shores 
the boats head for Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily), or Malta, and/or further north. 
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The Spanish and Italian territories in and near Africa are thus the main destinations on the 
way to the EU. After all, arriving on one of these territories means actually landing in the 
European Union, which opens up a broad range of possibilities of other countries to go to. 
However, before migrants actually arrive in departure areas like airports, seaports and the 
coasts of different African countries, they have usually been on a long journey on the African 
continent in order actually to get there (see van Moppes 2006; also Spaan and van Moppes 
2006). Migration destinations are to a large extent determined by historical factors (colonial 
ties) and there is some degree of consolidation. Migration patterns, however, are becoming 
increasingly less transparent and are rapidly changing; radical changes have recently oc-
curred in the direction and volume of migration. 
In the first place a reversal of migration has occurred in many countries: former emigration 
countries, such as Spain or Italy, and also Botswana (Gwebu 2006), now act as both immi-
gration and transition areas. Other examples are Nigeria and Kenya, which have developed 
from immigration into emigration areas (often in combination with assuming a role as a transit 
area (de Haas 2006; Rutten 2006). An increasing number of countries are affected not only 
by emigration or immigration, but are also the subject of both at the same time (e.g., Mo-
rocco). Another example is Senegal: c. 2 million Senegalese abroad (France, Gabon and 
Ivory Coast), but at the same time the number of foreigners in the country is estimated at 
800,000 (Broekhuis and Ndione 2006). Countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal in-
creasingly act as transit areas:  
 
Transit areas 
Rwanda: 
Comme pays de transit, le Rwanda, grâce à l’Aeroport international de Kanombe, est une voie de 
transit pour les populations de l’est du Congo et des Burundais qui vont en Europe, en Amérique et en 
Asie, car l’aeroport de Kanombe est desservi directement ou indirectement par des grandes compa-
gnies internationales (SN Brussels, KLM), parfois via Nairobi. De même, la plupart des marchandises 
en provenance des ports de Mombassa et de Dar Es-salaam, principaux ports de l’Afrique orientale, 
transitent par le réseau routier Rwandais (Muhoza and Rutayisire 2006: 4).  
 
Kenya: 
Kenya is a transit country for Ethiopia, Rwandans, Somalis, Eritreans and Asians. Our borders are 
porous, which makes it easy to sneak in and out of the country Most people do not move through 
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Jomo Kenyatta Airport, although it is the hub for East Africa and beyond. They simply pass over coun-
try towards the border and leave public and private transport some 5 km before the border town. With 
the help of agents they cross the border and in this way get reach as far as South Africa (Rutten 
2006:17). Transit is mainly from Somalia as a refugee to Kenya and then abroad for labour (Rutten 
2006: 18). Many of the illegal transit migrants discovered were of Asian origin (Chinese, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi passports) (Rutten 2006): 
Senegal: 
Dakar est un pôle de transit des réseaux illicites de migrants en provenance des pays africains (Nige-
ria notamment) et de certains pays asiatiques (Inde, Chine et Bengladesh par exemple23). Le nombre 
de pays touchés par ce phénoméne augmente rapidement, les routes du trafic se multiplient et se 
ramifient pour constituer des itinéraires de plus and plus complexes, et la participation de réseaux 
criminels organisés sur les plans transnational et local, and violation flagrante des normes nationales 
et internationales, est désormais répandue (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 8). 
 
As a direct consequence of restrictive policies in the core regions (i.e., EU, US etc.) new 
transition zones and more specific migration hubs have arisen between the place of origin 
and the place of destination (van Moppes 2006). Cities along the Sahara route, or places 
with direct boat and flight connection are attractive locations for people specializing in the 
migration business. Examples of important transition cities - where people stay temporarily to 
earn money - include Agadez (Niger), Bamako (Mali) and Tamanrasset (southern Algeria). 
Other examples of important migration hubs include Accra (Ghana); Banjul (The Gambia); 
Casablanca (Morocco); Dakar (Senegal); Ndjamena (Chad); Douala (Cameroon); Freetown 
(Sierra Leone); Tripoli (Libya); and Sal (Cape Verde). Finally, the cities of Lagos (Nigeria), 
Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Cotonou (Benin), and especially the capital of Guinea, Conakry, are 
named as places where travel documents can be easily forged, or where one can buy stolen 
travel documents (van Moppes 2006).  
Migrants are confronted with rising costs and are forced to earn extra money on the way (en 
route to Europe or the US) in order to finance the last part of their journey. Many continue to 
linger en route, having rid themselves of their old identity, and remain temporarily at an in-
termediate location as quasi-migrants. They have been forced to break off the journey en 
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route, but can often not go back, because they are afraid of loss of face or are unable to face 
repaying the sum that relatives and friends helped to advance24. The migrants often find 
themselves in poor circumstances particularly in the transition zones. These groups are ex-
tremely vulnerable to exploitation25. This refers especially to North Africa. 
 
Transit migration 
The difficulties of this final stage of their journey into Europe was what kept them in Morocco. When 
we asked what he needed to reach Europe, one Nigerian migrant replied: money, it is only money. 
Money or papers, but who’s to give you papers without money? Some people have friends in Europe 
who will take the risk and send them their papers, then they just get on the boat, no problem, but that 
is very rare. No, it’s only money. Most migrants are very well aware of the costs of the various means 
of reaching Europe and could rattle off a price list. One Nigerian women explained the full costs: by 
air, 3500 Euro, that’s the diplomats’ route; you get the passport and safe passage at the airport. By 
ferry, 2200 euro, that’s the normal passenger service. A Zodiac across from Tangiers is 1200 Euro; 
entry into Ceuta is the same, then Las Palmas is 800 Euro (Collyer 2006: 243). 
 
Restrictive policy (in the US, Europe, but also with the migrants’ own region26) has led to an 
increasing diversity of origin and destination areas. For example, the migration from Nigeria 
to EU was initially directed at the UK, but more recently, an increasing number of Nigerians 
have migrated to countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium as well as 
the Gulf states. In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new major destinations of 
labour migrants from West Africa (cf. Black et al. 2004:9; in de Haas 2006:3). Migrants from 
Kenya (originally focusing on South Africa, UK and USA), nowadays also migrate not only to 
the Gulf states (lowly skilled labour), and the Middle East, but also to Germany (Rutten 
2006). The Burkinabé (inhabitants of Burkina Faso, referred to above as a country with pre-
dominantly South-South migration) are also migrating increasingly to Italy. The Bolivians, 
who for a long time migrated to Argentina in search of work, are now migrating in large num-
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also be an individual decision (Broekhuis 2006).  
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bers to Spain. There is also increasing intercontinental migration within the south (e.g. Chi-
nese who migrate to Europe or the US via Kenya). Where previously, migration preferably 
took place along the more or less well-known routes, travel now preferably takes place to 
conventional destinations in order to evade tightened border controls as far as possible.  
Along with more restrictive policies, there seems to be a rapid increase in human trafficking 
and illegality. According to de Haas (2006:3) in Nigeria, increasing restrictions and controls 
on immigration in Europe have not led to a decrease in emigration rates. Rather, migrants 
are more often undocumented and the itineraries tend to be longer and more perilous. Ac-
cording to a recent study on Kano State, traffickers successfully exploited the annual pilgrim-
age to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes e.g. pros-
titution, begging and all forms of domestic work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006; in de Haas 2006: 
4). This has made Nigerian migrants more vulnerable to exploitation and marginalisation. It 
has also made migration more permanent, because people no longer take the risk of leaving 
(de Haas 2006).  
 
Human trafficking: examples from Nigeria 
In the early 1990, immigration restrictions made prospective emigrants increasingly dependent on 
large loans in order to pay for their journey. This provided an opportunity for traffickers, who enticed 
young women to migrate with promises of good jobs, and subsequently coerced them into prostitution 
to repay their migration debt (Carling 2005; in de Haas 2006:4). The initial contact with the traffickers 
is often made through a relative, friend, or other familiar person, who puts her in contact with a madam 
who organises and finances the journey. The costs may range from US$40,000 to US$100,000. The 
migrants and the madam conclude a pact, which is religiously sealed by a traditional priest, which 
obliges repayment in exchange for a safe passage to Europe (Carling 2005). After repaying their debt 
in one to three years, women are basically free, and it is fairly common for them to become a supervi-
sor of other prostitutes and, eventually, a madam themselves (de Haas 2006: 4). 
The main source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children in West Africa 
are Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, but almost every country in West Africa seems to be involved in the 
trafficking networks. Other source countries include Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, and Mauritania, whereas Ivory Coast, Niger, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo are countries 
that mainly import women and children. Trafficked children are usually recruited to work as domestic 
servants, in the informal sector, or into agricultural work on plantations. However, they can also be 
sold into slave labour, as in Sudan and Mauritania, or forced to become sex slaves to rebel com-
manders or affluent men, in Sudan or the Gulf States. Many women are forced into the prostitution or 
pornography business, and end up in other West African countries, or in the Gulf States or Europe. 
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Destination countries include Gabon, South Africa, and Ivory Coast; Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Lebanon; Germany, Netherlands, UK, Italy, Spain and France. The trafficking networks 
are, however, so complicated that most West African countries are simultaneously source, transit and 
destination countries for trafficking women and children (de Haas 2006: 25).  
 
In reaction to the restrictive policies, changes have occurred in the manner of travel. Com-
pared with previously, people now travel less often by air (that is reserved to the relatively 
well-to-do and to those travelling as tourists or students). Less well-off migrants preferably 
travel overland (cheap) or by boat (they cannot be immediately sent back) (van Moppes 
2006). Nigeria forms an example: Whereas labour migration and trafficking to Europe used to 
predominantly use air links, visa requirements and increasing immigration controls at air and 
seaports, seem to have led to an increasing reliance on trans-Saharan, overland routes to 
the Maghreb countries, and in particular Morocco, from where Nigerians and other sub-
Saharan Africans attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea to southern Europe or the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Canary Islands (de Haas 2006). From Senegal, too, migrants originally trav-
elled mainly by air and now increasingly by boat (if necessary, via Mauritania). The Journal 
Nouvel Horizon de Dakar27 gives an appropriate summary of the situation: ‘Après avoir utilisé 
l’avion, le bateau, le chemin hasardeux des caravanes sahariennes, la traverse suicidaire du 
détroit de Gibraltar, les barbeles de Ceuta et de Melilla, il ne reste plus que la voie la plus 
directe: la mer, et le moyen de transport le plus inattendu: la pirogue’ (Broekhuis and Ndione, 
2006:5).  
Important changes have recently also occurred in the composition of the migrant flows. 
Whereas migration was for a long time a matter for men, now it is increasingly women who 
take the plunge, whether or not accompanied by their family. Significant portions of females 
now migrate independently to fulfil their own economic needs (Adepoju 2002: 7 ; in Moppes 
2006)28. Their proportion is currently estimated at over 50 percent29. As a result, radical 
changes are occurring not only in the division of roles between men and women and in par-
enthood in general, but also in relations between the generations. In the case of migration 
the grandparents often play an important role in bringing up the children who remain behind. 
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Increasingly, however, it is also the children themselves who decide to migrate, even before 
they have completed their schooling. Thus there is not only feminisation, but also rejuvena-
tion of migration flows (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006).  
Lastly, changes have occurred in the occupations and level of skill of migrants. While, for-
merly, many migrants were wage earners, now a considerable proportion consists of self-
employed entrepreneurs. As a result of recruitment (by universities and companies), there 
appears to be a shift towards higher skilled migrants, although a large proportion still consists 
of poorly skilled ones (van Moppes 2006). The heterogeneity of the migrant population can 
be illustrated drawing on the example of Nigeria (de Haas 2006): There is circumstantial evi-
dence that more recent migrants to continental European countries are less skilled on aver-
age, and that they more often work in the (formal and, particularly in southern Europe, infor-
mal) service, trade and agricultural sectors of the economy. The UK and, in particular, the US 
(through student and professional migration as well as the Green Card lottery) generally con-
tinue to attract the relatively higher skilled workers30. The Gulf states have also started to at-
tract the relatively highly skilled (in addition to the low-skilled labour).  
 
In Burkina Faso, inter-continental and intra-continental migration have to be seen as two different stra-
tegic household decisions. Households with intercontinental migrants belong to the relatively wealthi-
est socio-economic group and migration to Europe is part of their wealth accumulation strategy. These 
households were able to deal with entry barriers linked with capital-intensive economic activities. 
However, a change from traditional to modern food production systems and to modern cropping pat-
terns did not occur.  
Households involved in intra-continental migration, on the contrary, have access to less livelihood 
capital and their migration decision is a response to push factors. For this group, migration has to be 
understood as part of a consolidation or survival strategy. Eat away migration is part of the way they 
save on household expenses (Broekhuis 2006:7).  
In general, international migration from Burkina Faso is said to be temporary, partly circular. It can be 
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concluded from the large numbers of Burkinabé who remained for some generations in Ghana and 
Ivory Coast that this assertion does not always hold31. However, the (...) survey showed that the young 
men who migrated to Ivory Coast were indeed circular migrants. These migrants were preponderantly 
young men without education, who worked before they left for the neighbouring country. They stayed 
abroad for an average of two years before returning to their home village. Over time the village of ori-
gin lost much of its importance as a destination for returnees32. Migrants to other countries had more 
often an urban background and were unemployed before their departure33 (Broekhuis 2006: 8). 
 
Compared with earlier times people are now much better able to bridge great distances in a 
short time and to maintain intensive contact with the area of origin. In a certain sense the 
world has shrunk. Where travel formerly meant years of absence, today’s migrants can travel 
quickly and maintain contacts with several places at the same time. Migration is increasingly 
transnational and consists of an ongoing series of cross-border movements in which immi-
grants develop and maintain numerous economic, social and cultural links in more than one 
nation34. In the case of transnationality people find themselves neither here nor there: they 
find themselves in several places at the same time, as it were, and try to make strategic use 
of the differences which exist between countries35. Thus there is a growing group of transna-
tional entrepreneurs who commute intensively in an attempt to profit from the economic op-
portunities which present themselves in several countries at the same time. They belong 
both to their region of origin and to their reception region36.  
 
4. Viewpoints in the areas of origin: common issues 
In analysing the characteristics of migration in the various countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
we found a number of common features that can be summarised under the following head-
ings: 
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Migration is not new: traditional types of population mobility  
In most sub-Saharan countries the population has always been one of the most mobile in the 
world. There are many examples of nomadism, and livelihood systems are based on peo-
ple’s ability to move in response to seasonal variation and variability of natural resources. 
International borders imposed during colonial times were often not in line with the natural 
conditions, nor did they coincide with the territorial claims of different ethnic groups. Interna-
tional migration is therefore man-made, i.e., a reflection of the introduction of artificial 
boundaries. Some of the international migration forms part of indigenous patterns of mobility 
(i.e., traditional, seasonal movements within one and the same eco-region). (see de Haas for 
Nigeria; Rutten for Kenya; and Broekhuis for Senegal and Burkina). 
 
Migration patterns reflect colonial patterns of forced labour 
During the colonial period, large flows of Europeans moved in the direction of the Asia, Latin 
America and Africa and introduced systems of forced labour in order to have sufficient labour 
in the colonial economy (mines and agricultural estates). In addition to the deportation of 
slaves to of South America and the Caribbean37, there were important population movements 
to the mining areas and the coastal regions (plantations). In addition, taxes imposed by the 
French stimulated many Burkinabé to migrate to Ghana as a way of escaping from French 
colonial rule (Broekhuis 2006). After independence, some of the colonial population left, to be 
partly replaced by the arrival of a new group of Europeans who moved voluntarily in search 
of new opportunities overseas. But the dominant migration routes remained the same, with 
mines and agricultural estates still being important destination areas for African migrants 
(colonial patterns of circular migration in the direction of the coastal areas). In Nigeria, the 
dominant movement of internal migration is still towards the densely populated coastal areas, 
although Abuja in the centre and Kano in the north are also major destinations for internal 
migrants (de Haas 2006). 
 
Rapid urbanisation and a brain drain 
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In the 1950s and ’60s most countries had to cope with rapid urbanisation (internal migration) 
and where Africans decided to leave (international migration) it was often the elite who left. In 
countries such as Nigeria, there was a large outflow of the elite to Europe and the US (as a 
response to political change, conflicts and disparities in economic opportunity), which re-
sulted in a rapid brain drain. 
 
Anti-migration policies 
Where national governments made an attempt to reduce urbanisation or to counter the nega-
tive effects of mass migration (brain drain) they usually did so by introducing exit visas (e.g., 
in Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania, as well as Burkina Faso [Broekhuis 2006:8]). In 
Rwanda, but also elsewhere, people were obliged to pay guarantees (deposits in bank ac-
counts) and family members had to sign before people were allowed to leave the country. 
Governments did their best to fix people in the countryside, often as part of socialist policies 
(Tanzania, Mozambique; for the latter, see Raimundo 2006).  
 
Alternations between immigration (economic growth) and expulsions (crisis) 
In many cases, countries have experienced reversal of migration, in response to economic 
booms or stagnation. Countries like Nigeria and Ivory Coast, as well as South Africa, Kenya 
and Ghana attracted migrant labour during times of rapid economic growth, followed by crisis 
and economic decline, which often went hand in hand with the expulsion of foreign popula-
tions. In Nigeria, after a period of rapid growth between 1973 and 1981, economic decline led 
the government to expel large numbers of West African migrants in 1983 and 1985, including 
one million Ghanaians (de Haas 2006). Other examples –often combined with political con-
flicts- include Ivory Coast and Ghana (expulsion of large numbers of Burkinabé) and Kenya 
(expulsion of Ugandans and other groups in 1984 and 1987) (Rutten 2006). Kenya and 
South Africa and also Botswana (Gwebu 2006) now have to cope with discrimination and 
xenophobia. 
 
Root causes of migration 
The history of migration cannot be seen in isolation from poverty and other push factors that 
are often described as root causes of international migration. Because of harsh environ-
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mental conditions (droughts, less fertile land) and a low technological level, the agricultural 
sector is unable to provide employment and income for the constantly increasing population 
numbers (Broekhuis 2006: 7, writing about Burkina Faso). Similar factors are mentioned for 
Central and East Africa: ecological degradation and disasters (droughts) and the lack of eco-
nomic prospects and conflict are among the principal causes of migration (see Spaan and 
Moppes 2006; Rutten 2006).  
 
Recruitment programmes, family reunion and asylum policies 
In various countries (Nigeria, Ghana, but also South Africa) emphasis is given to the fact that 
international migration has started and recently intensified as a direct response to recruit-
ment programmes. Universities and enterprises in the Gulf states and the Middle East, Can-
ada and the US, and different EU countries play an active role in ‘cherry picking’. Current 
migration patterns cannot be understood without taking into account the history of guest 
worker programmes, consolidated by the subsequent process of family reunification. Later 
migration is also a reflection of northern asylum policies. It is stressed that, for a long time, 
core countries have played an active role in shaping migration flows. The introduction of 
restrictive policies occurred relatively recently. 
 
Lack of comparable data   
Much emphasis is placed in many countries on the lack of data and deficient information 
about international migration. Within sub-Saharan Africa (but also elsewhere) the comparison 
of statistics is very complicated. A first factor which should be taken into account when trying 
to make an assessment of the importance of international migration is that of differences in 
population size. In a country like Nigeria, with its large population, international outmigration 
is relatively modest in comparison with massive internal migration (large numbers of IDPs), 
but it is still considered one of the most important sending countries, with large numbers of 
Nigerians concentrating in the US or UK.  
According to the statistics, there is a clear distinction between internal and international mi-
gration, but this is not necessarily a different experience. In many cases, the impact of inter-
nal migration (short distance) is not necessarily less than long distance, international border 
crossings. In the case of Nigeria, for example, taking into account the huge ethnic, linguistic 
and religious variety, as well as the fact that non-indigenous inhabitants of states face con-
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siderable legal institutional discrimination, the characteristics and personal impacts of inter-
state migration may resemble those of international moves, especially within Africa. It is im-
portant to observe that differentials in development within Nigeria are at least as important, if 
not greater, than between West African countries. The difference between international and 
internal migrants is not always clear, and in many cases conflicts also occur in relation to 
internal, short-distance migration.  
 
Definitional problems 
Another distinction made in statistics, but which is not always visible in reality is that between 
labour migrants, IDPs and refugees. Different groups live in different situations. Refugees 
who went to Burkina Faso (a restricted group of 1,200 people from Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Eritrea, Somalia and Chad) are allowed to live dispersed in the cities and are not concen-
trated into camps (Broekhuis 2006). This is the opposite to the situation in Kenya, where 
people live in camps and are not allowed to work. A Somali, who entered Kenya as a refu-
gee, will lose this special status as soon as he leaves the refugee camp. Refugees become 
illegal aliens as soon as they leave the refugee camp (Rutten 2006). In addition, refugees are 
sometimes better off than native groups living in the same area: In Kenya, the Turkana living 
near a refugee camp receive less support and experience more insecurity than the foreign 
groups who are supported by UNCHR (Rutten 200638). Depending upon the definition (mi-
grant, refugee, IDP) or nationality, people have varying chances of receiving support by in-
ternational organisations, but also for buying land or getting a job in government (not possi-
ble for aliens in Ivory Coast).  
 
The Burkinabé, who were forced to return to their country of origin after expulsion from Ivory Coast, 
were never granted the legal status of refugees. After their arrival in Burkina Faso, most of them were 
seen as return migrants (i.e., they did not get the status of refugees). At the same time, however, their 
children (who were born in Ivory Coast and returned with their parents) were registered as immigrants 
(they had never been able to acquire Ivorian nationality. While they are not eligible for official govern-
ment jobs or able to own land in Ivory Coast, they are also not accepted as full citizens in Burkina 
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 see also Horst 2006, for the situation of Somali refugees. 
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Faso. 
   
Conflicting images and tensions 
In addition to these definitional problems, there are complications related to the image of 
migrants, and how people look at each other from different sides.  
In host countries, migrants are often seen as strangers who are different from local people, 
who have different habits and attitudes and who came to profit from better living conditions in 
the host country. In their country of origin they are seen as money makers, a positive image 
based on the remittances brought or sent home through informal or formal channels. In addi-
tion it is expected that migrants will acquire specific knowledge during their sojourn abroad 
which can be used in their own interest after their return or applied in the interest of their 
country of origin. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the image of migrants is not so positive 
(Broekhuis 2006) and there are increasing tensions between the migrant population and the 
non-migrants. In Burkina Faso there is an increasing competition between the tengas (native 
people) and the diaspos (children of emigrated Burkinabé who have returned from Ivory 
Coast and have decided to study in Burkina because of the lower costs and the hope of bet-
ter job opportunities).  
 
Remittance corridors and geographical restrictions 
In the case of international migration, it is acknowledged that the impact of remittances is 
spatially limited, because most migrants originate from particular areas and concentrate in a 
limited number of destination areas. This means that migration not only generates patterns of 
dependency, but also creates patterns of spatial and social inequality. 
In Nigeria, for example, most of the migrants who have moved to the EU and US originate 
from the southern provinces. The Ibo from the southeast and the Yoruba from the southwest, 
and, to a lesser extent the Edo and the Ogoni ethnic groups constitute the majority of Nige-
rian migrants in the UK39. On the other side (the destination areas), too, the areas involved in 
international migration are rather limited. 50% of all the Nigerians - and also Kenyans - who 
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 Hernandez-Coss et al. 2006.  
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migrated to the US are to be found in Washington, with the rest distributed between Texas, 
California, Georgia and North Carolina (Rutten 2006). This means that international migration 
in reality involves only a limited number of areas; the majority of the population will not be 
able to benefit from migration. 
 
New labour opportunities thanks to the ageing of the population in Europe  
International migration is viewed in nearly all countries as something necessary and positive; 
as long as there are insufficient work opportunities in the migrants’ own country, partly as a 
result of demographic growth, international migration is a logical response and a human right 
as long as no better alternatives exist. It is expected that Europe will need extra labour in the 
years to come as a result of the ageing of the population and that Europe, like the US and 
Canada, will turn to a more selective migration policy40. Europe’s need creates opportunities 
for labour migration, in particular, for doctors, nurses and technical experts41 (Broekhuis 
2006:5). At the same time, little information is available about Europe’s future labour needs. 
 
The criminalisation of migrants 
In most sub-Saharan countries illegal or clandestine migration42 and human trafficking are 
regarded as undesirable, and many countries are prepared to cooperate in combating them. 
Besides programmes aimed at combating trafficking in women and children, the combating 
of illegality, including the forging of documents is high on the agenda.  
At the same time, however, it is experienced as a great problem that migrants (including ille-
gal immigrants and victims of human trafficking) are being increasingly criminalised. People 
are wrongly treated as criminals. In most countries there is understanding for European at-
tempts to counteract unauthorised immigration. The more stringent admittance of migrants is 
usually not a point of general discussion, nor is it put forward as blameworthy policy, but it 
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 Commission European Communities 2003. 
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 Introductory speech of Minister for Youth and Employment (Burkina Faso). 
42
 It is interesting to note that, for a long period of time in Burkina Faso in the recent past, terms like illegal or 
clandestine migration were not used. It was more common to refer to migration spontane or migration sauvage 
(Broekhuis Burkina: 2006: 10-16).  
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does call for a larger allocation of visas. A point of concern, however, is the treatment of mi-
grants in Europe. There was a call from many sides for a more respectful treatment of mi-
grants and for the avoidance of indignity. Some blame was expressed about the failure by 
most of the northern countries to ratify the ILO Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (Broekhuis 2006:5). There is criticism in many 
countries of the present deportation policy and the way in which victims are sent back to the 
country of origin together with the human traffickers in the same aircraft (Broekhuis 2006, de 
Haas 2006). 
 
5. Issues on the policy agenda: a country overview 
The crucial objective of our research was to analyse viewpoint and policy initiatives in the 
countries of origin. What are the issues that are currently on the migration agenda in the dif-
ferent countries, and how is this linked to the performance of international migration? In the 
survey that follows we analyse the present situation in different countries, beginning with the 
analysis of agendas in countries with predominantly south-south migration (Rwanda, Burkina 
Faso), then countries with predominantly South-North migration (Senegal), ending with the 
countries classified as diasporic states (Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya, including China, India, 
the Philippines etc.). It is interesting to note that there is a kind of continuum in the migration 
agendas of the different countries.  
 
Rwanda  
In Rwanda, after years of conflict, the population has become dispersed over a large number 
of neighbouring countries and countries in the EU, where migrants have asked for asylum. 
The migration agenda is determined mainly by three issues (Muhoza and Rutayisire 2006). 
- How can we ensure that people are prepared to return to their country of origin (a 
considerable part of the population still lives abroad and has insufficient trust to re-
turn)? 
- How to ensure that the diaspora is prepared to invest in Rwanda? 
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- How do we manage to attract the necessary expertise from abroad? Because of the 
lack of skilled labour in Rwanda teachers and medical personnel are attracted mainly 
from the neighbouring countries (including Kenya). 
 
Burkina Faso 
In past years large groups emigrated from Burkina Faso to Ivory Coast to work in the planta-
tion economy there. There has recently been a massive deportation. The migrant population 
has returned en masse, together with their children who were born in Ivory Coast. The follow-
ing subjects are currently high on the agenda (Broekhuis 2006): 
- How do we deal with problems of poverty the rural exodus and urbanisation (Broek-
huis, Burkina) and how to provide sufficient employment for young people? 
- How to guarantee the protection of migrant rights (how to ensure that the Burkinabé 
in Ivory Coast are better treated)?  
- How to deal with the sudden arrival of return migrants and how to incorporate them 
without generating conflicts? Burkinabé who were massively deported from Ivory 
Coast no longer fit within the traditional structures. How to take care of integration of 
exmigrants in local communities/ how to prevent land conflicts/ how to promote sus-
tainable development of natural resources? How to prevent migrants moving from in-
security to poverty?.  
- Special attention is paid in this connection to the problems of the second and third 
generation: Burkinabé children do not have Ivorian nationality (they are second class 
citizens in Ivory Coast), but are regarded in Burkina Faso as immigrants. How to deal 
with this second generation? 
- How do we deal with increasing tensions between the tengas and diaspos (children of 
Burkinabé who have emigrated to Ivory Coast who come to study in Burkina because 
it is cheaper and because they are not eligible for government jobs in Ivory Coast)? 
- How to ensure that the remittances which are sent back from Ivory Coast can be re-
ceived in the countryside (there are no banks); are used for productive purposes 
(there are few investment opportunities). Remittances are largely used to repay the 
costs of migration (including maintaining social obligations). 
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- How to ensure that the volume of remittances increases and stabilises? At present 
remittances are relatively small: they decreased from 4.5% (1994) to 1.7% of DGP 
(2006). Remittances are currently an unstable source of income, both at the level of 
the state and at the individual household level.  
- How to ensure that the image of Burkina is improved so that people want to invest 
there (in the eyes of its emigrants Burkina Faso is oldfashioned, hot and dry)/ how 
can remittances be used for employment generation? 
- How can migrant organisations be persuaded to become more actively involved in 
national or local development? 
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Migrant organisations in Burkina Faso expressed the following list of wishes (Broekuis 2006: 10): 
- assistance from embassies and consulates in the case of emergencies and expulsions; 
- regulations for social security through bilateral agreements; 
- information for potential migrants about rights and obligations in the receiving country; 
- information about investment opportunities in Burkina Faso, other possibilities than housing 
projects; easy procedures for buying land. 
- fulfilment of international treaties by Burkina Faso (criticism of other countries is impossible if 
one’s own country sets a bad example); 
- bilateral agreements on migration quotas (Italy mentioned as an example); 
- Embassies should collect information about compatriots present in the country43; 
- Right to vote for migrants; this would ensure the involvement of migrants in developments in 
their home country; 
- Improvement of money transfer arrangements. There was a lot of criticism of the lack of 
SONAPOST services and the high costs of transfer by banks. Suggestion: development of in-
ternet banking! 
- Easy procedures for obtaining official documents, including those for the children of Burkinabé 
abroad. 
 
Senegal 
Senegal was for a long time an immigration country (mainly for the neighbouring countries), 
but now there is an important flow of emigrants to the EU. This makes Senegal an example 
of a country that has to deal both with immigration and emigration, while it acts also as a 
transition zone. The inflow of remittances is seen as an important part of a strategy for na-
tional development. The migration agenda is dominated by very different agenda items 
(Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006): 
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 Counter-argument: a limited number of migrants register at embassies.  
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- How can more employment be created for the youth? 
- How can we benefit more from our population overseas (in France and other EU 
countries) and how do we manage to increase the volume of remittances (reduction 
of transition costs). Comment gagner la confiance des emigrants? 
- How can we guard our borders better and control the inflow of migrants from the 
neighbouring countries. How to combat the forging of identity papers?  
- How to deal with the problem of undocumented migrants who originate from 
neighbouring countries and (after deportation) claim to be Senegalese in the EU?  
- How to negotiate with Spain and France on the question of readmission and how to 
best profit from migrant quotas? 
- How can we best profit from the funds which are available for migration development 
(e.g. TOKTEN and MIDA). 
 
Au Senegal, le gouvernement a annoncé une tolérance zéro en matiére d’émigration clandestine! 
Cependant la politique de migration officielle exprime dans la presse ou sur les conférences récentes 
est de fixer la population sénégalaise avec des programmes de développement qui favorisent 
l’épanouissement individuel et collectif ainsi l’espoir de prospérité économique. (Broekhuis and 
Ndione, 2006: 9). On veut eviter le depart des jeunes! 
Pour beaucoup de jeunes africains subsahariens, l’enfer est chez soi et le paradis ailleurs. Le 
message fort envoyé aux gouvernements des pays d’origine et d’accueil est qu’ils se lanceront 
toujours désespérément la quête de nouvelles stratégies de contournement des politiques migratoires 
et de franchissement des frontières. (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 12). 
 
Nigeria  
Nigeria has played an important role for a long time as an immigration country, but at the 
same time a large part of the population has become dispersed over a large number of coun-
tries. It possesses a considerable diaspora, with concentrations in the UK and the US. Within 
Nigeria the migrants and remittances play only a relatively small role. The GNP and the 
economy are largely determined by oil, and the migrant population forms a very small propor-
tion of the total population. Nigeria is characterised by a high level of ethnic heterogeneity. A 
large part of the population is classified as internally displaced (IDPs) and there is a measure 
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of discrimination and xenophobia. To the extent that attention is paid to migration in Nigeria, 
it is mainly the following topics that are of interest (de Haas 2006): 
- How can we act against trafficking in women and children/combating human traffick-
ing in general, supported by international organisations (OIM). This point has been 
placed on the agenda partly because Nigeria attaches importance to the improve-
ment of Nigeria’s in the world (Nigeria is very much associated with criminal activities 
(such as trade in cocaine, financial fraud, money laundering, human trafficking etc.). 
- How to improve the image of migration/end the criminalisation of migrants. All un-
documented migrants are categorised as illegals and the traffickers are deported to-
gether with the victims (see also above). How to improve the rights of migrants in the 
case of repatriation; repatriation often has the characteristics of deportation (with un-
documented migrants are treated as criminals and as not leaving voluntarily). In many 
cases the traffickers are repatriated on the same charter flight as their victims. Al-
though the readmission agreements with European Countries state that undocu-
mented migrants should be returned on a voluntary basis, many repatriations have 
the character of deportations, with undocumented migrants being treated as crimi-
nals. Undocumented migrants who are apprehended in Europe are imprisoned in de-
tention centres before being deported and aircraft are full of police and security peo-
ple (de Haas 2006: 9-10). How to solve the problem of fake identity papers (see also 
Kenya)? 
- How to deal with foreign groups, including refugees and IDPs? In a country like Nige-
ria, there are many foreign groups: from Ghana and Mali, Togo and Benin and Niger 
(according to recent UN estimates, over 971,000 immigrants live in Nigeria44), and 
there are also large numbers of Internally displaced people. How do we deal with 
problems related to xenophobia (which also affects migrants from neighbouring 
states)? 
- How can we launch the presidential dialogue with Nigerians abroad; and restore trust 
among the Nigerian diaspora? How do we deal with the high insecurity and crime 
rates, high level of corruption, and lack of economic reform? How can we make it 
more attractive for the diaspora to invest their money in Nigeria? 
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- How can we create more legitimate opportunities for migration? How can we better 
prepare for exploiting global employment opportunities (brain circulation)?  
 
The issue of trafficking of female Nigerian sex workers is currently an important issue in Nigeria: it is 
estimated that there are 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes, not only in Italy, but also in the Netherlands and 
Spain. According to a recent study, traffickers, especially in Kano state, have successfully exploited 
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes, 
e.g. prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006). There is some 
pressure from the US and from donors to combat trafficking (de Haas 2006). Trafficking is also seen 
as harmful to Nigeria’s image abroad (de Haas 2006:10). 
The National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP), 
works in collaboration with UNICEF and OIM. There is also an anti-trafficking programme for West 
Africa (PATWA) (de Haas 2006: 11). 
 
Kenya 
Like Nigeria, an important part of the population has emigrated from Kenya over a longer 
period and become dispersed over various countries of the world. This gives Kenya the 
characteristics of a diasporic state. While the elite have emigrated (e.g. to the US), Kenya - 
as a safe haven – has played a role as a reception country for the neighbouring countries. 
Kenya acts as a concentration country for the reception of refugees. Large groups of Somalis 
currently find themselves in refugee camps, are not entitled to work or to settle freely.  
The migration agenda is determined by the following subjects (Rutten 2006): 
- How do we treat refugees (and how do we prevent the Somalis taking our jobs?). 
How do we deal with them in relation to marginal national groups (such as the Tur-
kana)? Refugees are considered to be relatively better off: a range of services and 
benefits are available from NGOs and UN agencies (provisions like water, education 
and medical attention receive priority in the camps). As they are not allowed to own 
cattle or farm, they are given regular food hand outs45.  
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- How can immigration controls and visa policies be operated to limit illegal immigration 
(the problems here include: false documents supporting visa applications; false bank 
statements, letters of reference etc). How do we deal with the Asians who use Kenya 
as a transition zone? How to close the borders to terrorists (demanded by the US in 
reaction to the attack on the US embassy). It was concluded in the 2005 mid-term 
strategy report that Kenya had suffered in the recent past from international terrorism 
whose roots had to do with the movement of people across boundaries. The revela-
tions in some of the cases of terrorism indicate that Kenya’s immigration services 
may not have the capacity to deal with the sophistication that goes with international 
travel today (Rutten 2006:6). It was noted that there was a need to streamline immi-
gration screening procedures for the entry of refugees and to eliminate all discrimina-
tory screening practices (demanded by NEPAD). In Kenya aliens are obliged to regis-
ter (Rutten 2006:15). 
- How do we act against human trafficking and enslavement? 
 
In Kenya, trafficking is considered an important issue: Kenya is a source, transit, and destination coun-
try for men, women, and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation. Kenyan children 
are trafficked within the country for domestic servitude, street vending, agricultural labour, and sexual 
exploitation, including the coastal sex tourism industry. Kenyan men, women, and girls are trafficked to 
the Middle East, other African nations, Western Europe, and North America for domestic servitude, 
enslavement in massage parlours and brothels, and manual labour. Chinese women trafficked for 
sexual exploitation reportedly pass through Nairobi, and Bangladeshis may pass through Kenya for 
forced labour in other countries. Burundian and Rwandan nationals engaged in coastal sex tourism 
may have been trafficked for this purpose. Lastly, Asian nationals, principally Indians, Bangladeshi 
and Nepalese, are trafficked into Kenya and coerced into bonded labour in the construction and gar-
ment industries (Trafficking in Persons Report 2004), in Rutten 2006:3; (There has been a human 
trafficking unit In Kenya since 2004).  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
age. They don’t like us because we get rations, and they are very hungry she says. They are angry because their 
land is dry. In the neighbourhood of the camps, there are sometimes conflicts that give rise to further internal 
displacement (Rutten 2006: 11-12). 
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- How can the diaspora be deployed strategically in national development? After Presi-
dent Kibaki won the 2002 election he called upon Kenyans to return home. This was 
mainly addressed to those intellectuals who had opted to go abroad for political rea-
sons during the rule of President Moi. At the same time, the new government an-
nounced its intention to create 500,000 jobs annually. However, this ambition was not 
met. Estimates are that only some 50,000 jobs were created in the first six months af-
ter it came into power. Kenya was apparently not yet in a position to welcome home 
its community abroad. Moreover, there was a growing realisation that the Kenyan di-
aspora was becoming a significant player in Kenya’s economic development through 
the remittances sent home from abroad (Rutten 2006:20).  
- How can we ensure that highly qualified labour is strategically deployed? In Kenya 
there is a special office with the task of promoting the strategic deployment of exper-
tise overseas. 
 
Examples of issues in other countries 
(China, Leung 2006; India, Rhaguram 2006; the Philippines, Baggio 2006; Ghana, Manuh 
2006; and Mexico, Marchand 2006): 
- How do we increase the flow of remittances/ and ensure that the money is used for 
social and/or productive projects in the collective sector (Tres por Uno; Mexico)?  
- How to reduce the dependency of a country on remittances (Cape Verde) and how to 
reduce/compensate the negative effects of the brain drain (Ghana)? 
- How to maintain the contacts with the diaspora in the longer term, i.e. how to ensure 
that second and third generations also continue to be involved (China, India, Korea)? 
- How do we improve the living conditions of the migrants overseas; How to prevent 
abuses?/ how to prepare the migrants better for living abroad (Philippines, Mexico)? 
- How do we make the best use of diaspora organisations and migrant organisations 
for the development of the country of origin without this leading to fragmentation/ pro-
liferation (the Philippines has over a thousand organisations worldwide)? 
- How to ensure that the diaspora is prepared to invest in the mother country (China, 
India, Korea)? how do we ensure an attractive investment climate? 
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6. A summary of concrete policy initiatives 
Reviewing migration as a policy issue, it becomes clear that, since colonial times, the stimu-
lation and/or controlling of migration has been an important strategy for encouraging eco-
nomic growth (through, for example, systems of forced labour). Since independence, African 
states have tried to respond to the brain drain and urbanisation by issuing exit visas and 
obliging people to remain in the countryside (Mozambique, Rwanda, etc.). In some countries, 
it is thus only recently that people have been free to move and this should be taken into ac-
count when trying to assess international migration. Where the volume of international migra-
tion has increased, this is the result partly of time-space compression and the technological 
revolution, and partly of the neo-liberal reforms and processes of regional integration, which 
have stimulated the free movement of capital and goods. Neo-liberal policies have also re-
sulted in the collapse of local economies which, together with ecological problems, have re-
duced the opportunities for local development. 
In spite of the growing concern of governments with migration issues, and the large range of 
topics that are currently on the policy agenda, most of the sending countries have no consis-
tent migration policy. In most instances there is a laisser faire approach, with no obstacles 
being thrown up in a systematic manner to limit international migration or measures being 
taken to strengthen migration. While there have been great efforts at the regional level in 
recent years to secure the right of free movement, residence and establishment (in Africa, 
ECOWAS, UEMOA, AU; in Latin America, MERCOSUR, ALCA etc.), the implementation has 
been subject to many restrictions: most conventions, treaties and agreements have proved to 
be dead letters without ratification by national parliaments or their translation into national 
laws (Broekhuis 2006)46. In sub-Saharan Africa the efforts to achieve the free movement of 
persons has led in a certain sense to reduced possibilities for controlling migration, and hu-
man traffickers have been able to profit from this.  
In recent years a great many arrangements have been made by northern countries (EU) with 
individual countries, for example, between Nigeria with Italy; as well as between South Africa 
and Namibia, Botswana, and Tanzania and DR Congo etc.; and Senegal with France and 
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Spain (Rutten 2005). There is a growing number of bilateral arrangements between countries 
to control migration, in some cases, combined with co-development programmes. At the 
same time, there has been some intensification of recruitment, not only from the US/ Can-
ada/ the EU or the Gulf States, but also within sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, high school and 
elementary school teachers were recruited throughout the 1990s in such places as the Sey-
chelles, Rwanda, Burundi and Congo (Rutten 2006: 19). Today, recruitment is strong, espe-
cially in South Africa. In the negotiations between the sending and receiving countries condi-
tions are often imposed relating to border controls, which can have a harmful effect on the 
relations between neighbouring countries.  
As far as the link between international migration and combating poverty is concerned, inter-
national migration is referred to only to a very limited extent at the level of the individual 
countries in the context of PRSPs (van der Veen 2006). There is generally no systematic 
policy. Migration is either referred to as a negative force (e.g. Nigeria) or related to positive 
developments, but there is no systematic approach and international migration has not so far 
been cited as a structural element for combating poverty. Migration is still primarily seen as a 
development failure rather than a constituent part of broader social and economic transfor-
mation processes (de Haas 2006: 12-13). The boxes below show how migration is regarded 
in the various countries and the sub-themes to which it is related (see also van der Veen 
2006, and Black 2004). 
 
Nigeria 
Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), better known in Nigeria as NEEDS (see NNPC 
2004), mentions internal migration, which is generally seen as a force disrupting social cohesion in 
village societies and causing urban unemployment. Migration is strongly and one-sidedly associated 
with trafficking, forced child labour and prostitution. In addition, Nigeria’s PRSP perceives internal mi-
gration as a force which potentially contributes to urban unemployment and urban pollution and waste 
management problems (NNPC 2004:12 + xix). Migration of the educated workforce to urban areas 
would also cause the ageing and deepen the poverty of rural populations (NNPC 2004:32), and is 
indirectly blamed for the decrease in the level of security through social dislocation caused by massive 
rural-urban migration, and the breakdown of societal values, leading to fraud and community unrest 
(NNPC 2004:95). The perceived solution to these problems is to develop rural areas to stem rural-
urban migration through rural development schemes (NNPC 2004:70). The PRSP proposes imple-
menting an integrated rural development programme to stem the flow of migration from rural to urban 
areas (NNPC 2004: ix). Nigeria’s PRSP warns that if rural development strategies fail and internal 
migration continues, the rate of urban unemployment could become unmanageable. The implications 
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for poverty and crime, conflict, and the maintenance of democracy are grave (NNPC 2004: 43) (de 
Haas 2006:12-13). 
Nigeria’s PRSP draws a clear link between democratisation and economic growth, on the one hand, 
and the role of emigrants and donors to national economic development on the other. Some momen-
tum for change has been building since the transition to democracy in 1999. Increasing numbers of 
Nigerians in the diaspora are willing to return and contribute to the economy, and many of the donor 
agencies that boycotted Nigeria during the military era have returned (NNPC 2004: 13). The PRSP 
also aims to continue to actively strengthen links with Nigerians and other Africans in the diaspora, to 
deepen technical and business ties with the rest of the world, and improve export market penetration, 
especially in textiles, food and cultural artefacts (NNPC 2004: 83); de Haas 2006: 15. 
 
Burkina Faso 
Burkina does not pursue a real migration policy. Migration enables households to supplement their 
income, to diminish income falls and spread risks; in more favourable cases savings as result of mi-
gration can be used for investments in economic activities. Increase of South-North migration is ex-
pected as result of globalisation processes and is expected to contribute to the wealth of households 
involved and the country as a whole. The costs for individual migrants and their families of this high 
migration prevalence in terms of suffering and risks and disruption of family life are occasionally men-
tioned. During the symposium some participants put forward the possible effects of migration on social 
cohesion. But this aspect did not consider families and local societies which had to deal with the ab-
sence of a large part of their members, but at the integration of rural internal migrants and repatriates 
in host communities and their access to natural resources as threats of existing social cohesion. 
(Broekhuis, Burkina). 
 
Senegal 
Pour mieux grer et rentabiliser les efforts des sénégalais vivant à l’étranger dans sa contribution au 
développement du pays, les pouvoirs publics ont mis en place diverses institutions successives dans 
le temps et développé plusieurs stratégies politiques liées au return et la réinsertion des migrs.: de 
promotion et de protection des Sénégalais de l’extérieur; (ministère des sénégalais de l’extérieur). 
(Broekhuis and Ndione 2006) 
 
Kenya 
The PRSP mentions the need to increase surveillance and strengthen immigration points at the border 
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points of entry in order to curb the large influx of refugees and the proliferation of illegal firearms. (Rut-
ten 2006:2) 
 
Summarising the types of programmes that are currently under way, we can say that they 
are usually a combination of the following measures. (Some of the measures are supported 
by Dutch development cooperation (indicated in the listing by **). 
 
Policy priorities in the sending countries (also prioritised on the migration and development 
agenda of receiving countries/ donor agencies) 
- Increasing the flow of remittances/ensuring a more productive investment of the 
money through forms of co-financing (co-development in West Africa/ Tres por Uno in 
Mexico). 
- **Measures aimed at encouraging brain gain and limiting brain drain; encouragement 
of return often linked to northern programmes (MIDA, TOKTEN; in Senegal, Ghana, 
and also Burkina Faso). While in many sending countries there is an interest in how 
an impulse can be given to brain gain (without the expectation of return), many do-
nors and receiving countries place the emphasis mainly on return and/or limiting the 
brain drain. Donors try through programmes such as MIDA and TOKTEN to create 
possibilities for bringing expertise back to the region of origin, although the numbers 
are very modest and the success is limited (and the number of beneficiaries is not in 
proportion to the total number of migrants and/or expatriates. 
 
France launched the idea of co-development in the 80s/early 90s. This idea was adopted as a new 
development strategy by European leaders at their summit meeting in Tampere (Finland) in 1999. 
Follow-ups to this idea were given in Cotonou 2000, the Paris Seminar in 2000 and at the Dakar Con-
ference in 2000. The MIDA project (Migrations pour le développement en Afrique) was launched in 
2001 in Libreville (Gabon) by 20 African countries. Key elements of this project are: involvement of 
private and public sectors, initiatives and financing by African countries themselves with the assis-
tance of OIM; encouragement and facilitation of the return of qualified nationals.  
Le TOKTEN est un autre projet de mobilisation de l’expertise de l’extérieur en vue de leur transfert 
dans le pays d’origine, par le biais de missions d’intervention de courte dure. Sur la base des deman-
des exprimées par rapport aux besoins des structures publiques et privées au Sénégal, le projet iden-
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tifie les cadres qualifiés répondant aux profils de ces besoins et organise leurs voyages. Contraire-
ment au projet Initiatives de codéveloppement qui se limite en France, le TOKTEN cible tous les pays 
d’accueil des Sénégalais, notamment les pays développés du Nord. 
 
- ** Capacity strengthening/ improvement of border controls, intended to limit immigra-
tion from neighbouring countries. Investments are made within the framework of this 
policy and with financing from northern countries in the training of customs officials 
and equipment to sharpen border controls. This is employed in Kenya in order to 
keep a better check on internal migration (e.g. by Asians) and to keep out undesirable 
aliens. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, the borders are highly porous; migrants re-
spond to strengthened border controls by taking alternative routes (at a higher cost 
and risk) they linger for a longer time in transition zones. This approach generally 
does not lead to a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants, partly because it 
does not solve the problem of overstaying (people enter legally on a tourist or student 
visa, and stay longer than permitted). As soon as the stamp expires the holder be-
comes illegal and often there are no possibilities of leaving the country legally.  
- ** Combating human trafficking (mainly of women and children, partly linked to the 
problem of forced labour). Many anti-trafficking policies are financed and carried out 
in collaboration with donors/ receiving countries (including the ILO). Different empha-
ses are placed by the sending and receiving countries. The sending countries are 
critical of the receiving countries because they find that illegal migrants are not 
treated with respect. Most Nigerian stakeholders, in particular, those in non-
governmental positions criticise the anti-trafficking policies of the European states, 
because they do not differentiate between traffickers and their victims, who are in-
stead collectively labelled as illegals and subsequently expelled. They stress that se-
rious anti-trafficking policies should address trafficked men and women as victims 
and protect their rights. A blanket repressive approach will work counterproductively, 
because it increases the strong reciprocal relationship between traffickers and their 
victims, who have career perspectives once they have paid off their debts and so 
have some prospect of improving their livelihoods in the longer term. 
 
Nigeria: 
According to the ILO, there are at least 660,000 forced labourers in sub-Saharan Africa, of whom 
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130,000 are victims of trafficking. However, the study revealed that 80 percent of forced labour in the 
region is for economic exploitation and 8 percent for commercial sexual exploitation (Ehindero et al. 
2006); in the Haas 2006:5).  
The ILO office in Abuja is active in anti-trafficking, although with an emphasis on forced labour. Since 
2004, ILO’s Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) has implemented the Pro-
gramme of Action to combat trafficking in West Africa (PATWA) by addressing the structural aspects 
of the demand and supply of trafficking in persons and the consequent forced labour in West Africa. 
The ILO collaborates with government (Ministry of Labour), unions (National Labour Union) and em-
ployers (National Labour Consultative). The IOM office in Abuja has conducted a project on Trafficking 
of Women and Children, but funding has now ended. The Nigerian president has appointed a Special 
Assistant to the President on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs. Her office has established a techni-
cal committee of government ministries and agencies47, which are currently discussing a coherent 
policy on migration and development. Members of civil society do not seem to be actively involved in 
the process. This process is facilitated by the Abuja office of IOM. 
 
Kenya: 
In Kenya there are district advisory children’s centres providing psychosocial services, medical and 
educational assistance and foster programmes for vulnerable, orphaned or abandoned children who 
are at risk from trafficking (Rutten 2006). 
IOM provides training on the issue of human trafficking. In spite of this support, Kenyan migration offi-
cials have also pointed fingers at IOM, UNHCR and the US embassy for handing out visas for family 
reunion which, they claim, trigger human trafficking into Kenya. Migration in the name of family reunion 
can easily result in human trafficking. The US embassy, IOM and UNHCR issue visas even if these 
people have entered Kenya illegally. They do not allow the Kenyan authorities to prosecute them for 
being in Kenya illegally. IOM does not want us to prosecute because it is too costly for them, as peo-
ple will have to stay longer when tickets might have been arranged for them. Thus IOM breaks the law 
on human trafficking and gets away with it. According to Ministry of Labour officials, the IOM pro-
gramme to bring back Kenyans was a top-down programme brought to the East African community 
when Ugandans wanted to return home, but not so much the Kenyans and Tanzanians. IOM sets the 
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 The committee consists of the ministries of Finance, Education, Justice, Science and Technology, Intergovern-
mental Affairs and Youth Matters, Women’s Affairs, Health, Foreign Affairs. It also includes the following agen-
cies: the central bank of Nigeria, National Commission for Refugees, NAPTIP, National Population Commission, 
Nigerian Labour Congress, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), National Planning Commission and 
the National Human Rights Commission.  
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agenda; we dance to their tune. 
 
Policy priorities in the sending countries together with the diaspora (partly supported by re-
ceiving countries/ donor agencies).  
- The institution of a ministry of diaspora/ minister for diaspora (starting initiatives in Ni-
geria, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Argentina); intensifying contacts with the population 
overseas. (comment gagner la confiance des emigrants?) 
- Starting up cultural programmes etc.; spreading information; granting the franchise to 
the population in the diaspora. (is currently being discussed in several countries, in-
cluding Kenya and Nigeria) 
- Programmes aimed at improving the investment climate – aimed at attracting invest-
ment, e.g. by offering tax concessions etc. (examples: China, India and Korea; start-
ing in Senegal).  
 
Policy priorities in de sending countries (not on the migration and development agenda of 
receiving countries/ donor agencies) 
- Protection of the rights of migrants; the ILO Convention on Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (not ratified by most of the northern 
countries) 
- How to create youth employment (e.g. in Senegal, Burkina)? Part of conventional de-
velopment policies, but not on the migration and development agenda. 
- Encouragement of immigration and return, e.g. in Rwanda. Le gouvernement Rwan-
daise encourage l’immigration des experts et des investisseurs étrangers. C’est dans 
le souci d’attirer ces investisseurs qu’un environnement favorable a été créé grâce a 
la mise en place d’un code particulier d’investissement. Forms part of the refugee 
agenda, but usually from the perspective of the reception region. 
- Exporting the labour surplus /the development of remittance corridors. In different 
countries active attempts are made to facilitate emigration (providing ser-
vices/institutional reforms) while an attempt is made to maximise the positive effects 
(e.g. the Philippines, Kenya, Ecuador); How can we best capitalise on future labour 
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needs and how can migrants be better prepared for their task (improvement in qual-
ity)? In countries like Kenya there is an active policy aimed at exporting highly skilled 
labour (there is a special office for outplacement). In the Philippines, too, there is a 
tendency to target the training of professionals for work abroad. Not supported by re-
ceiving countries (not on their agenda; it is associated with threatened invasion) 
- Reducing the dependency on remittances/ promoting a greater stability (Cape Verde, 
Kenya); not on the migration and development agenda of donors. 
 
Policy priorities in the receiving countries/donors (not so much in line with priorities in send-
ing countries) 
- **Encouragement of circular migration (is presented as a win-win situation, because it 
makes migration possible without the threat of an invasion). From experience with 
migration to the Gulf States (strongly regulated migration with temporary labour con-
tracts) it can be stated that there are nevertheless increasing tensions. There is a 
demand for this form of migration (as a means of supplementing income), but it offers 
no solution to the group which is mainly interested in career migration. The thought of 
return migration plays in the background of discussions on circular migration. This 
leads many sending countries to react with suspicion. 
- Anti-migration campaigns/ information to make people aware of risks and dangers. 
Emphasis is placed in discussions in the receiving countries, and by donors, on the 
need to stop the brain drain (not often referred to in the sending countries) and the 
need to inform people about the risks of migration (in the sense of anti-emigration pol-
icy). In most of the sending countries these issues do not stand very high on the 
agenda. Where countries are confronted with a brain drain, they generally look for the 
solution in compensation programmes (people must be free to go, migration cannot 
be stopped). They are convinced that anti-migration propaganda does not work. They 
simply say: ‘east, west, home is best. But this is the wrong message. You won’t stop 
people from going. You should instead inform people how to migrate legally, so as to 
create a balanced opinion. Migration is not really a bad thing’ (de Haas 2006: 12), al-
though it is acknowledged that many people lack information about what to expect at 
the other end and are therefore vulnerable to exploitation. 
- Policies for improving migration data. It is mainly from donor circles that resources 
are currently being provided for the provision of reliable information (migration statis-
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tics). Senegal is a pilot country in this respect. La conception de cet observatoire re-
pose sur une valorisation scientifique des données administratives, collectes par des 
outils qui permettent un accés à l’information en temps réel. Depuis 2002, des systé-
mes de collecte d’informations, crés partir de l’informatisation et de la mise en réseau 
des postes frontaliers, des juridictions et des agences consulaires du Sénégal sont 
mis en place par l’IRD et la direction de l’informatique de l’Université Cheikh Anta 
Diop (UCAD) du Sénégal, en partenariat avec les Ministres de l’Intérieur, de la Jus-
tice et des Sénégalais de l’extérieur. Ces dispositifs sont appelés Observatoires sec-
toriels. L’ensemble s’appuie sur des compétences nationales et une coopération sud-
nord (Broekhuis and Ndione 2006). At the same time it can be noted that insufficient 
attention is being paid to problems relating to the definition of migration (or more spe-
cifically the paradigms underlying such concepts as newcomer or alien, IDPs, refu-
gee, circular migrant, and the consequences which a particular designation have for a 
person’s development chances. This less statistical and qualitative dimension re-
mains underexposed, but is of great importance (more important than the precise 
quantification of the numbers of migrants). 
 
- ** involvement of migrants - diaspora organisations. There has recently been a grow-
ing interest from the sending region in making contact with the diaspora. Govern-
ments in reception zones and donors are trying to involve migrants actively in the 
formulation and/or implementation of policy in their region of origin. In the process 
they address the migrants and such diaspora organisations as exist in the reception 
region. By doing this, they are trying to benefit of the ‘overseas’ development poten-
tial (see section 7), but the problems should not be underestimated. Many migrant or-
ganisations are not expert in the field of development, are often not representative or 
politically coloured, and/or are sometimes seen from the perspective of the sending 
countries as defectors. Whether a contribution can be made to development through 
the support of diaspora organisations depends on the quality of the available exper-
tise, and the extent to which the activities of the diaspora organisations worldwide can 
be harmonised with each other (in the case of the Philippines, for example, there are 
c. 1000 organisations [Baggio 2006]). In the worst case projects carried out by such 
organisations interfere with the mainstream policies carried out by the national gov-
ernment or local organisations. 
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7. Intermezzo: African diaspora organisations in the Netherlands and 
development 
During our research, while focusing on the perspective of the sending countries, we also in-
terviewed migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen et al 
2006) in order to learn more about their views and perceptions, and to explore the opportuni-
ties for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to link with development-oriented MOs in the Nether-
lands in order to optimise the contribution of MOs to local, regional and national development 
in the countries of origin. Based on an earlier inventory of some 150 organisations (van 
Heelsum 2005; 2006) and additional research48, we made a selection of 67 African develop-
ment MOs49, and interviewed representatives of the most important of them, focusing on 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Cape Verde Islands, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda (the analysis which follows is based on van Naerssen et al 
2006; see Kusters et al 2006 for an overview of the selected organisations)50. 
The African development MOs are diverse in character.  This applies to their size, their 
reach, the budget available, the types of projects and the political and economic context in 
which these projects have to be realised. The majority of the MOs are under ten years old 
and their members are mostly first generation immigrants. They are supported by a variety of 
Dutch organisations and institutions such as municipalities and Dutch CFAs. There is less 
involvement of private business (although there is some). MOs are more or less informed or 
otherwise find their way in the maze of funding organisations. 
To the extent that MOs are actively involved in carrying out development activities in their 
countries of origin, projects are mostly local and small-scale. They are particularly repre-
sented in the sectors of education and health care. Nevertheless, the reach of small-scale 
projects can be large, as in micro-credit and awareness-raising programmes. The question of 
the sustainability of the projects is hard to answer, since most of them have been started only 
recently. Much depends on the local situation. Usually the relation with the local environment 
                                               
48
 We compiled a list of all development MOs on the basis of information from the CFAs, internet and other 
sources of information, after which we checked whether these organisations still existed. It turned out that many 
MOs had ceased their activities or could not be reached.  
49
 We limited our research to development MOs, i.e., the MOs with the clear objective of contributing to develop-
ment in the countries of origin, as registered at the Chambers of Commerce. 
50
 See for further details working papers Migration and Development deries, reports 12 and 13. 
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has been established at an informal level and good relations with family members and village 
chiefs are important. The reasons given for not engaging with local authorities at the formal 
level are corruption and inefficiency. 
The MOs are of opinion that they have to improve their capacity to have a larger impact, but 
they also point out that much of their work is on voluntary basis. As their assets – or relative  
strengths - they mention strong motivation, knowledge of the culture in the country of origin, 
being well informed and speaking local languages. Nevertheless, some comments on this 
added value should be made. The real asset (or strength) of the MOs is that they possess 
social networks and knowledge at the local and regional levels, but not much at the national 
level. Social networks constitute useful social capital, but they might also constrain develop-
ment, since linkages and obligations might lead to less objectivity and efficiency. Local 
knowledge and local relations are, of course, important, but it should also be acknowledged 
that they are no substitute for professional and technical skills.  Finally, people’s perception 
of emigrants in the home countries is not always necessarily positive.  
There are indications that there are differences in attitude between first generation and sec-
ond generation migrants. With the latter, personal ties with people of the home country are 
less strong, which has both advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage is that the sec-
ond generation is usually less engaged in individual remittances, but the advantage is that 
they are inclined to social remittances (i.e., projects in the sphere of development). The sec-
ond generation of MOs (a minority) seem to be more assertive and demanding a place in the 
development circuit.  
The success factors of African MOs are in principle the same as those of Dutch develop-
ment-oriented organisations51. Apart from factors dependent on the specific regional or coun-
try contexts, the major factors that contribute to success are adequate anticipation of the 
demand, visible short-term results, ownership of the project by the target group, and profes-
sionalism of the project initiators. Project failures are mostly due to the lack of these success 
factors. The question is whether the strong assets of MOs, namely social contacts and local 
knowledge, constitute an added value compared with similar Dutch development NGOs. Dur-
ing the interviews references to this added value were made in the relation to the start of the 
                                               
51
 A development project is successful if it is sustainable, contributes to welfare improvement and empowerment 
of the target group. For large-scale programmes one can add the contribution to the realisation of the millennium 
development goals (MDGs).  
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projects. However, the degree to which local knowledge and social capital are decisive for 
the success of projects is not clear.  
African development MOs are well aware that ‘development’ is more than erecting a building 
or the donation of computers to students. The need to involve the community is a common 
wisdom and the complexity of ‘development’ is acknowledged. However, one has to start 
somewhere and the resources are limited. Education is often considered as a good starting 
point and there is usually a demand for it. With the support of Co-Financing Agencies 
(CFAs), some MOs are involved in peace-building processes. However, this does not alter 
the fact that only a small number of MOs are explicitly involved in issues of good governance 
and democratisation (mostly in the form of information campaigns). Initiatives in this respect 
deserve strong support, the more so since these are issues that the MOs themselves con-
sider as crucial for the development process and that are high on the agenda of Dutch de-
velopment cooperation. 
African MOs expect advice and financial support from the Dutch government and CFAs. 
There is a lack of understanding and appreciation of the country policy of Dutch development 
cooperation. Greater attention, more dialogue and a stronger involvement in Dutch develop-
ment policy are desirable. At the same time, MOs want more understanding for the circum-
stance that they are often dependent on volunteers.  
The CFAs are important for the MOs. They encourage professionalism among the migrants 
and their support enables programmes and projects to be implemented on a larger scale. 
Nevertheless, there exists widespread and outspoken criticism of CFAs. It seems that mutual 
communication could be better.  The two representatives of two CFAs we interviewed recog-
nise that there are tensions between CFAs and MOs as the following quotations of CFA rep-
resentatives show:  
A great problem of the CFAs and the migrant organisations is that both sides are ar-
rogant. They both think that they know it all, instead of cooperating to share knowl-
edge and join forces. 
Migrant organisations differ from each other, so we should not generalise. But what 
they say about our bureaucracy, our lack of decisiveness and the like, unfortunately, 
is true. Another difficulty is that our choice of a selective group of countries is difficult 
to explain. 
The MOs are usually embedded in a larger system in which internal and international emigra-
tion is a way for many Africans to improve their household or family livelihood. Among the 
African MOs in the Netherlands it appears that there is not much knowledge of migration 
policies in the country of origin, nor is there an inclination to influence or exert pressure on 
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this policy (in the way that the Mexican and Philippine diasporas do).  One suggestion re-
peatedly made was that information should be provided to change the rather optimistic pic-
ture of migrants’ lives in Western countries.  
It is interesting that a change has occurred worldwide in the relationship between the gov-
ernments of countries of origin and the MOs. Emigrants are no longer viewed as ‘defectors’ 
but as ‘countrymen abroad’, who can contribute to development. Ghana is a case in point. 
The country supports initiatives of knowledge transfer, including the MIDA (migration and 
development) programme of the ‘Ghana Health project’ coordinated by IOM-Netherlands.  
Another example is Cape Verde, which aims to encourage migrants’ investments and is con-
sidering cooperation with the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) in order to start 
return migration programme. Mention was made in our interviews of the representatives of 
Burkina Faso and Kenya in the Netherlands who have undertaken efforts to link with MOs.  
In other European countries there are other, larger-scale, examples of cooperation between 
governments and their diasporas, such as the French co-développement programmes (since 
1997) and the ACCORD initiatives in the UK.   
 
8. Final reflections, recommendations and suggestions for follow up  
This brings us to the final question: How can consistent migration policies contribute to com-
bating poverty? At this moment, several ‘sending’ countries are looking at ‘migration and de-
velopment’, but there are several reasons why international migration will not automatically 
result in poverty alleviation or sustainable development.  
Much will depend on the type of destination where migrants decide to go. People moving to 
the Gulf States will – in comparison with migrants who move to other destinations - have 
fewer possibilities for upward mobility than those who migrate to the US/Canada or the EU 
(and where conditions are better for establishment, family reunification, etc.).  Within the EU 
there are wide differences between countries in the possibilities for integration and becoming 
full citizens, which will determine to a large extent whether migrants will be able to benefit 
from migration or not. In comparison with other EU countries, the Netherlands is not viewed 
by many migrations as the most ideal destination, partly because of the language, but cur-
rently also because of the integration policies. Where people do arrive in the Netherlands, 
this is sometimes transit migration (there is currently an exodus of Somalis from the Nether-
lands to the UK).   
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At the country level, the development potential of migration will greatly depend on the way 
countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the 
possibility of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed 
South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the 
countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions. In the 
case of south-south migration, migrants often travel without the required documentation, they 
are vulnerable to exploitation – do not receive protection; job opportunities – as well as sala-
ries - are usually unfavourable in comparison with the northern destinations; the flow of remit-
tances is small in comparison with the flow of money coming from the northern states, and 
much of the suffering remains invisible (northern countries have biased views, focusing in 
particular on the consequences of South-North migration). 
To the extent that receiving states/ donors are currently implementing ‘migration and devel-
opment’ policies, these are mainly aimed at controlling dominant patterns of south-north mi-
gration. The areas of origin are treated as ‘sending states’ without taking into account that 
many of these countries also play a role as immigration and/or transition areas. EU countries 
and a selected group of emigration countries are currently negotiating readmission and/or 
migration quotas (bilateral agreements), often without taking into consideration the negative 
consequences for intra-regional relations (i.e., restriction of migration from neighbouring 
states).  
 
Migration has clearly risen on the agenda in bilateral relations between Nigeria and the European 
states, who specifically seek Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of undocumented migrants or 
rejected asylum seekers of Nigerian citizenship . Some countries are hesitant to concede to demands 
from the Nigerian side for certain quotas of legal migrants in exchange for cooperation on re-
admission, as Italy is doing (de Haas 2006: 9).  
 
In addition, there is another paradox: regional organisations (ECOWAS, AU etc.) aim at facili-
tating ‘free movement of persons’, but also acknowledge the need to control migration. Proc-
esses of regional integration seem to have given more space to human traffickers and have 
restricted the possibilities for states to control migration. 
Restrictive policies – and more intensive border control in northern countries - have often 
been unable to solve the problem of illegal migration, but have – instead - resulted in a more 
complex situation. Migrants are forced to spend more money and time, take higher risks, and 
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are more dependent on smugglers than before. The likelihood of international migration help-
ing to combat poverty is less favourable than before. Migrants are increasingly attracted to 
criminal activities (to earn large amounts of money in a short time); the migration agenda has 
become mixed up with anti-terrorism; and human trafficking has intensified. 
International migration might have helped groups of people to escape from poverty, but we 
should not forget that, in many cases, the impact tends to limited, even in the most favour-
able circumstances. Where migrants do manage to send remittances to their areas of origin, 
these flows are usually geographically concentrated (and benefit only small numbers of peo-
ple). Flows of remittances help to create ‘islands of wealth’, but will in many cases not con-
tribute to ‘national’ development. Another problem is the variability of remittance flows and 
the lack of sustainability. Even if remittances are stable in the short run (first-generation mi-
grants sending home significant amounts of money on a regular basis), this seems to be de-
cline in the course of time (second or third generations often lose interest and feel less com-
mitted). Experience shows that migration streams from particular areas will usually not last 
longer than about 20 years, and that the intensity and direction of migration will very much 
depend on economic growth, which will vary in time.  
Even though migration is nowadays described as a strategy aimed at spreading risk (com-
mon in the ‘new economics of migration theory’), it often results in new vulnerabilities.  
There is a considerable group of migrants who – due to migration - suffered downward social 
mobility: they fell ill (malaria), were involved in an accident or became victims of robberies or 
exploitation; well-educated women working as domestic servants will often not be able to 
fully exploit their capabilities. Another negative dimension of migration is the intensification of 
land conflicts and rising land prices (use of remittances for the purchase of land ). Interna-
tional migration – along with the liberalisation of land markets and the use of internet - has 
opened the door to a real estate boom. International migrants – and also tourism entrepre-
neurs – are increasingly appearing as a new category of absentee landowners. 
Where attempts have been made by policymakers to maximise the positive impact of interna-
tional migration or to restrict the negative implications, most of the sending countries in sub-
Saharan Africa do not yet  have well-established policies. It is a new policy field and there is 
a wide variety of topics which very much depend on the particular position of countries. In our 
analysis (see 6) we showed that there is some overlap between the ‘migration and develop-
ment’ agendas of northern and southern countries (increasing the flow of remittances, com-
bating human trafficking, improving border controls, stimulating brain gain etc.) but this is 
very much dependent on the country under consideration, and that, within the South, there 
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are considerable conflicts of interests between countries. We also showed that – where 
northern countries or donors invest in ‘migration and development’ programmes 
(MIDA/TOKTEN) - the number of beneficiaries is small in comparison with the total migration 
flow. From the perspective of the sending countries, it seems unrealistic to expect migrants 
to be willing to return as long as there are no comparable employment or educational oppor-
tunities. In many sending countries, the focus is not so much on ‘return’; instead, policymak-
ers are searching for ‘long distance’ types of support by migrant populations. While they ac-
cept that people should have a right to move freely, they aim to get the diaspora involved by 
inviting them to send money or make investments. In general terms, in donor policies there is 
a bias in favour of countries with south-north migration and little is done for the countries ex-
periencing south-south migration. 
 
Recommendations 
In order to improve the development impact of international migration and to make interna-
tional migration more relevant to development, we have the following recommendations: 
 
A. Improvement of current policies (supported by donors and northern countries): 
- Anti-trafficking measures (programmes to stop the trafficking of women and children) 
should continue to receive high priority (supported by sending and receiving coun-
tries). At the same time, however, the sending countries are unhappy that victims and 
traffickers are treated equally as criminals. Priority should be given to stopping the 
criminalisation of the victims (and to focusing more on the traffickers). Legalisation of 
the victims is seen as an important requirement making anti-trafficking more effective. 
- Anti-migration policies and/or intensification of border controls as a strategy for re-
stricting illegal migration is not effective. Rather than investing in strengthening border 
controls (capacity building, technology etc.), more attention should be paid to prob-
lems of ‘overstaying’. 
- Where receiving countries show an interest in facilitating circular migration, it is nec-
essary to examine critically previous experiences (guest worker programmes) and the 
development implications of current migration towards the Gulf States. The ageing 
population in Europe might offer opportunities for Africans on the European labour 
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market, but little is known about the particularities of future labour needs, and how 
such migration can help to promote essential productive investments and knowledge 
transfer. A better orientation towards the international labour market is needed if the 
country wishes to profit more from international migration. It is also important to an-
ticipate better the growing competition between different migrant groups (how is it 
possible to guarantee that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa will be able in the long 
run to compete with migrants arriving from Asia and Latin America?).  
- It is recommended that an analysis be made of to what extent MIDA-TOKTEN initia-
tives (aimed at brain gain/ brain circulation) form part of mainstream development 
policies (PRSPs and sectoral plans), and analyse to what extent these are in conflict 
with ‘traditional structures’. What is the capacity of local institutions to facilitate ‘rein-
tegration’ and or the return of people, and what is the impact of ‘foreign expertise’? 
What kind of institutional adaptations are necessary (e.g., property rights, inheritance 
rights etc.).Who is responsible for the people moving in and out, and what are the so-
cial security implications for these groups? What are their rights and obligations of 
circular migrants and who is responsible (the government of the sending or the re-
ceiving country)? 
- Where support is given to migrant and diaspora organisations, it is important to also 
consider supporting such organisations in the countries of origin (e.g., in Burkina 
Faso there are numerous migrant organisations). Northern government and donors 
could continue to help migrant organisations to establish contacts with the area of 
origin, but also diaspora organisations in other countries, thus facilitating communica-
tion and information flows. (For more specific recommendations related to MOs in the 
Netherlands, see C.) 
 
B. New orientations: 
- Greater priority should be given to the problems of countries with South-South migra-
tion, and to those of  transition areas/ migration hubs (how to improve the situation of 
transit migrants? In doing this, sufficient attention should be paid to the Asian-African 
(and potentially Latin American) connection. 
- More emphasis should be given to supporting national governments and/or local 
groups (in sending countries) to establish links with their diaspora. Many sending 
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countries are interested in intensifying relations with countries with substantial mi-
grants group, but the financial means of their governments are limited.  
- More attention could be paid to the worldwide problem of discrimination and xeno-
phobia (including in the South). Rather than continuing data collection –and deepen-
ing the contrast between how migrant and non migrant populations get along  (as is 
currently done by different donors), it is necessary to make a critical review of the 
paradigms used (aliens, 'immigrants', expats) and to assess how, in different coun-
tries, this categorisation contributes to stigmatisation, exclusion etc. 
- More attention should be paid to the negative implications of the boom in bilateral 
agreements (readmission, migration quotas) for the intra-regional patterns of collabo-
ration and/or interstate relations within the south. 
- Given the growing interest in circular migration (see above), it would be interesting to 
collect more concrete information about how to monitor ‘urgent labour needs’ (not 
only in the North, but also within the South in relation to HIV-AIDS etc.). How can we 
match demand and supply, and make circular migration more relevant to African la-
bour requirements? 
- Priority should be given to providing more and better information to different catego-
ries of migrant groups. How can we inform migrants before their departure about the 
conditions in host countries; inform women and children so that they do not become 
victims of traffickers, AIDS and other diseases; inform people about visa require-
ments etc. (and the need to formalise their presence); economic investment possibili-
ties; assessing the future labour needs; obtaining information about new laws and in-
ternational treaties. etc. 
- It is urgent to initiate a discussion about the new role of embassies and consulates – 
they are currently providing visas and passports, but what is their future role in dis-
tributing information (see above); in providing assistance in the case of emergencies 
and expulsions; in preparing agreements to improve social security etc? 
- More attention should be paid to the problems of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
and refugees, in particular the ‘ecological refugees’ (together with political conflicts, 
one of the root causes of forced migration). Early warning systems and spatial plan-
ning could help to prevent forced migration. 
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- It is important to mainsteam ‘migration and development’ policies in the direction of 
anti-poverty strategies. The current emphasis on ‘migration and development’ should 
not result in the reallocation of money in favour of the migrants. The majority of the 
population (97%) is geographically stable; they are quite reluctant to leave their 
homes and villages or towns. More explicit attention must be paid to how to control 
population growth and/or improve local employment opportunities, especially for the 
youth. 
 
Suggestions for collaboration with the African diaspora in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen 
et al 2006; and Kusters et al 2006): 
• There are several hundreds of initiatives of Dutch civil society in the field of develop-
ment cooperation with non-Western countries.  These NGOs are mostly locally or re-
gionally based, their projects are small in scale and their funding sources diverse. 
The development-oriented African MOs fit into this pattern. Although they possess 
specific assets such as knowledge of foreign cultures and languages, there is no rea-
son to give them a privileged position in development cooperation and acquiring fund-
ing. The major criterion for funding should be the professional qualities of the those 
implementing and the quality of the project. The aim of development is not here, but 
there, in the home countries of the MOs. 
• Migrants have a relative advantage by being rooted in more than one society. This 
‘transnationalism’ offers a huge potential for development cooperation. This potential 
should be exploited, and optimised by dialogue, information on funding opportunities, 
capacity building programmes etc. Special attention should be paid to the second 
generation of migrants (and how to keep them involved). 
• African MOs in the Netherlands are small and greatly rely on volunteer work.  While 
acknowledging the value of the volunteer work, Dutch Development Cooperation 
agencies could facilitate and increase the quality of the work of MOs by organising 
training and exchange of experience sessions; and also by supporting MOs in the 
monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes currently carried out in Africa. 
This should preferably be done by independent institutions (i.e. not linked to the fund-
ing agencies). 
• During the past few years a dialogue has started between Dutch development agen-
cies and MOs. Return migration and mostly small-scale projects are now on the 
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agenda. The latter could be broadened by examining and encouraging social remit-
tances, transnational entrepreneurship, private investments and tourism in countries 
of origin.  Special and careful attention should be paid to the opportunities for MOs to 
engage in programmes in the field of good governance and democratisation in the 
countries of origin.  
• African MOs could learn lessons from Asian and Latin American MOs, in particular, 
with regard to lobbying the African national governments for migrants’ rights and fa-
cilitating social remittances. Lessons could also be learned from existing initiatives 
and programmes in other European countries. 
• Projects of MOs in all African countries should be considered for funding and other 
forms of support (i.e., not restricted to the partner countries).  
• Dutch CFAs and MOs should search for better ways of communication. It is a good 
thing that both sides acknowledge a certain field of tension in this engagement. Prob-
lems should be discussed at regular meetings, which could contribute to the diminu-
tion of mutual misunderstandings and to increasing the effectiveness of the pro-
grammes. More efforts need to be made to stimulate the learning process of working 
together.   
• The possibilities for ways of co-operation between Dutch development agencies, Afri-
can MOs in the Netherlands and governments of the countries of origin should be ex-
plored and expanded. Apparent examples are the dialogues with the embassies of 
Ghana and Cape Verde.  
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Appendix 1: Suggestions for follow-up research (in line with the policy 
recommendations): 
1. Migration hubs and transit migration 
We can conclude from our research that - especially in North Africa, but also in other areas - 
some areas develop into migration hubs and have to deal with a large concentration of mi-
grants - often originating from neighbouring countries - who do not settle to stay, but are in-
tending to make the ‘final jump’ to Europe as soon as they have made the necessary ar-
rangements and collected sufficient money. Many of these migrants seem to live in extreme 
vulnerability, being excluded from two sides: they are no longer considered citizens in their 
areas of origin (they have tried to shed their old identities), but are also not accepted as citi-
zens in the area of destination. They are not under protection and are ‘footloose’ with respect 
to institutional support systems. Policy formulation in this field (how to deal with transit mi-
grants and transition areas) is necessary in order to protect this category of people, who of-
ten do not have the possibility to return – nor are they able to move on. This research will 
also focus on how migrants perceive the pros and cons of different migration destinations 
(reputation of the Netherlands and other EU countries as destination areas). Attention should 
also be paid to the new Asia-Africa connection and the role of Africa as transition area for 
Asian migrants moving to the EU/ US. 
Selection of research location and implementation in collaboration with Prof. Aderanti Ade-
poju, preferably at various locations simultaneously. 
 
2. Migration as a booming business' 
New types of services and economic activities related to migration, in the areas of origin and 
destination. Migration is currently a ‘booming business in the sense of generating new types 
of services and economic activities, facilitating the communication between areas of origin 
and destination (internet cafés, couriers, financial services), but also contributing to import 
and export business, including tourism. Parts of these new economic activities are transna-
tional and help to strengthen transnational relations. In the discussion on international migra-
tion, little is known about the economic significance of migration-related activities, and their 
contribution to business development, economic innovation and, lastly, national develop-
ment. This research will result in a better understanding of the economic impact of interna-
tional migration, and the selective way in which the benefits are distributed between the ar-
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eas of origin and destination (what areas receive the most favourable impact?). To what ex-
tent does international migration generate impulses for new economic activities; what are the 
consequences in terms of complementarities, dependency and competition? Special atten-
tion will be paid to the link between tourism and migration. 
Research location:s Amsterdam, Madrid, sub-Saharan Africa (to be selected) 
 
3. The image and reputation of various EU-countries as areas of destination 
Currently, many people from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America move towards EU 
countries, and there is a clear diversification in the range of migration destinations. Whereas 
people previously showed a preference for the colonial ‘motherland, today they migrate to a 
wide range of possible destinations. Different countries have different reputations in respect 
of possibilities for getting work, and also in regard to discrimination, and the possibilities for 
being accepted as full member of civil society and/or family reunification. Some countries are 
seen as the ideal destination – and other areas are perceived only as transition areas (So-
malis leave the Netherlands, for example, and migrate to the UK). The Netherlands is not 
only a final destination, but also a transition area and migration hub. 
This research will contribute to a better understanding of image-forming (how do people as-
sess the opportunities at different destinations); what is the image of migrating to different 
destinations and what kind of expectations do people have? To what extent do we see differ-
ences between the migrants and the stayers; how do migrants and ‘stayers’ communicate 
(email, telephone etc.) and to what extent is there a gap between image, expectation and 
reality; how does this influence migration decisions? Special attention will be paid to the ex-
pectation that, as a consequence of their ageing population, EU countries are in need of mi-
grant labour, especially in the field of medical care. 
 
4. Migrants as competitors and rivals 
As a consequence of increasing migration, there is an increasing heterogeneity of different 
migrant populations. In addition to groups of expatriates who have become fully integrated 
and full citizens in the destination areas, there are migrants who are currently coming in 
search of work or in the framework of family reunification, or to obtain political asylum. In ad-
dition to this kind of diversity (based on the purpose of migration), there is an important dis-
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tinction between the different generations. The various EU countries use different definitions 
of the above categories, which has important implications for their development possibilities. 
This research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the heterogeneity of migrants 
and, more particularly, of the extent to which this is translated into patterns of competition 
and/or solidarity. In order to have a better idea about whether international migration from 
sub-Saharan Africa will contribute to sustainable development in the long run, it is extremely 
important to have a clear idea about how different groups of migrants compete – and the 
extent in which African migrants are capable of defending themselves against the arrival of 
migrants from Asia or Latin America. To what extent do migrants from different areas of ori-
gin have their own ‘niches’, how do they compete and what are the consequences for their 
capacity to build sustainable livelihoods? What are the urgent labour needs (not only in EU 
countries, but also in SSA), what are the varying abilities of different groups to benefit? How 
are migrant groups stigmatised and how does this influence their position on the labour mar-
ket? How do recruiters deal with the strengths and weaknesses of different migrant groups, 
and what are the implications? 
Research location: The Netherlands-Spain 
  
5. Embassies, diplomatic relations and the institutionalisation of migration 
International migration has important implications for diplomatic relations between the coun-
tries of origin and destination. More than in previous times, embassies fulfil a role for civil 
society – they have a responsibility in providing citizens with visa and passports. At the same 
time, however, many countries have developed into diasporic states with immense popula-
tions overseas; it is only relatively recently that national states have become interested in 
establishing closer links with this expatriate population and using this potential as a motor for 
the development of the mother state. 
Governments are taking the initiative in establishing ‘ministries of the diaspora’ as a way of 
involving the diaspora in national development. The contact between embassies and the 
diaspora is often very limited - there is often a lack of trust – and the range of services tends 
to be limited (visas, passports etc.).  
This research will focus on the following questions: What are the implications of international 
migration for the role of embassies and how do they respond to the need for new services? 
What is their role in the establishment of bilateral agreements (EU - sub-Saharan Africa) and 
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what are the consequences for diplomatic relations? How does international migration affect 
diplomatic relations? How can embassies and consulates play a positive role in providing 
necessary information and facilitating communication? 
Research location: visiting several embassies (Bolivia and Ecuador, Philippines, China, 
Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso). 
 
6. International migration, land speculation/ foreign-fundia and land titling 
International migration will – as a result of sending remittances - will often result in land 
speculation, rising land princes and, in some cases, even a real-estate boom. Because of the 
lack of alternative investment opportunities, migrant remittances are often used for the pur-
chase of land (even at a long distance; migrants often do not return). This is leading increas-
ingly to the existence of foreign-fundia (land owned by foreigners, as a new type of absentee 
ownership); people in northern countries, including tourist operators, buy large tracts of land, 
which they use for building homes, and also hotels or tourist estates. Recent processes of 
land privatisation, Internet communication – and migration – are contributing to a real-estate 
boom, and this is reflected in rising land prices.  
At the same time, donors are investing large amounts of money in projects aimed at the ca-
dastral registration of land. It is not so clear to what extent land titling and cadastral projects 
can help to control above trends, nor is it clear whether land titling programmes are suffi-
ciently focused on dealing with the consequences of migration.  What are the implications of 
land titling for circular migration? Is there a need for more flexible types of land ownership 
(renting, leasing, etc.), given the importance of flexible international migration? How do land 
titling programmes deal with ‘mobile’ populations? What kind of property regime is most ap-
propriate, given the high population mobility? What are the implications of migration for in-
heritance legislation? What are the consequences of international migration for land specula-
tion and absenteeism? 
Research location: To be defined, in an area with strong migration. 
 
7. Migrant and diaspora organisations (in relation to civil society) 
Increasing emphasis is being placed in current policy on migrant and diaspora organisations 
in the Netherlands. Less attention is usually paid to the organisations in the countries of ori-
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gin (organisations established by returned migrants etc.). The problem of diaspora and mi-
grant organisations, however, is that they are often representative bodies and may have little 
expertise relevant to development. How can these organisations be used to stimulate devel-
opment in the area of origin in such a way that it forms part of mainstream development poli-
cies and respects ‘local’ priorities (participatory approach).   
Research location: to be determined. 
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Appendix 2: Ideas for PhD projects  
The following PhD projects form part of the ongoing research programme ‘Global Mobility 
and Place’, which will be carried out as part of the Humboldt programme of Human Devel-
opment. The projects are approved projects, but implementation depends on the possibilities 
for co-financing. Candidates need to be selected in the course of 2007.  
 
Project 1: International Migration and European Borders 
This project will start at the macro level by making a comparative analysis of migration flows 
at the European ports of entry, focusing on people arriving from Latin America, Asia and Af-
rica. Research will concentrate on questions such as where do people enter and why, the 
influence of changing or varying border and immigration policies, and the role of borders, 
institutions and sources of information. At the micro level, the project will analyse the mi-
grants’ active role in searching for the loopholes at the EU borders, and their responses to 
different institutional settings. What is the rationality or irrationality of migration and bordering 
practices, and what are their consequences? What is the significance of borders for highly 
skilled and unskilled labour? What is the link between border regimes and legalisation state-
lessness? 
Key words: migration flows (highly skilled versus unskilled); border regimes and immigration 
policies; information flows and perceptions.  
Research location: EU ports of entry/departure ports in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
  
Project 2: Migration and Home: settlement and removal in the EU 
During recent  decades, EU countries have adopted different attitudes on how to deal with 
different groups of immigrants. Depending upon their location and also their labour needs, 
the various countries have adopted different policies with respect to settlement and integra-
tion. This project aims to make a comparative analysis of settlement and removal in different 
countries of the EU. Attention will be paid to the influence of the various institutional settings 
on how migrants seek attachment to place and the creation of locality. How do we deal with 
designations such as alien or guest in relation to how people link to places? 
Key words: settlement/ removal, identity, attachment to place, creation of locality; citizenship. 
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Research location: comparative research in a selection of EU countries. 
 
Project 3: Migration and Transnational Networks: diasporas within the EU, new networks and 
the impact for development 
The EU is home of different diasporas: large numbers of migrants from Latin America, Asia 
and Africa maintain contacts with their home countries. Nowadays, governments from their 
home countries plan to use these diasporas because they send home remittances or are 
potential sources of investment in their countries of origin. This project will analyse the role of 
diasporas in the creation of global and local linkages, and focus on the question of how to 
make diasporas more beneficial for development? Attention will be paid to the two sides (the 
EU and the sending economy). Key words: diasporas, networks, flows of capital, goods and 
information, development 
Research location: specific migrant groups, focusing on external networks. 
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